The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
{{“ensure
that those involuntarily displaced receive
humanitarian
assistance”;
and
•
requesting
the Secretary-General to establish a group of experts, to
report
within 100
days of the adoption of the resolution, “on Iraq’s existing
petroleum
production
and export capacity and to make recommendations … on
alternatives
for
increasing” that capacity.
818.
Finally, the
resolution expressed the Council’s intention “upon receipt of
reports
from the
Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC and the Director General of the IAEA”
that
Iraq had
“co-operated in all respects with UNMOVIC and the IAEA and in
particular in
fulfilling
the work programmes …. for a period of 120 days after” the
reinforced system
of OMV was
reported to be fully operational, to “suspend” sanctions on the
import of
materials
originating in Iraq or the export of items to Iraq (other than
those referred to
in
paragraph 24 of resolution 687 (1991) or controlled by the
mechanism established
by
resolution 1051 (1996)), “for a period of 120 days renewable by the
Council”.
Action to suspend
sanctions would be considered “no later than 12 months” from
the
adoption of
the resolution, “provided the conditions set out” in this paragraph
had been
“satisfied
by Iraq”.
819.
The draft
resolution had been tabled by the UK, and many members of the
Council
praised the
skill and perseverance of Sir Jeremy Greenstock and his delegation
in
producing a
draft which the majority of the Council could support after almost
a year
of deadlock
on Iraq.318
It is
clear, however, that there were still significant
differences
about the
interpretation of the resolution and the way ahead. As a result,
China, France,
Malaysia
and Russia abstained in the vote, but there was no
veto.
820.
Mr Lavrov
explicitly blamed the use of force by the US and UK in
December
1998 for
the deadlock in the Council, stating that the action had been
“provoked by the
biased and
tendentious report” from UNSCOM. Russian proposals in April 1999,
for a
draft
resolution approving the recommendations of the Amorim panels and
instructing
the
Secretary-General “to prepare practical steps for implementing
them”, had been
“blocked by
those who wanted … to continue using the burden of anti-Iraq
sanctions
in order to
attain their own unilateral goals, going beyond the scope of United
Nations
decisions”.
821.
Mr Lavrov
welcomed the provisions to suspend sanctions, the
“radical
improvements
in the humanitarian programme”, and the measures related to
speeding
up action
on missing persons and Kuwaiti property. He also welcomed the
corrections
to “harmful
provisions” in previous drafts of the resolution,
including:
•
removing
the “discredited argument about full co-operation”; Russia
had
“always stressed
that the wording ‘full co-operation’” was “extremely
dangerous”,
and “Nobody
has forgotten that it was under the pretext of an absence of
full
318
UN Security
Council, ‘4084th Meeting Friday 17 December 1999’
(S/PV.4084).
180