The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
215.
The first
consolidated report to the Security Council, in April, recorded
that both the
volume and
quality of information being provided by Iraq had diminished since
February,
and found
that:
“In all
areas for which the Commission has responsibility, Iraq has yet to
provide
sufficient
evidence that it does not still possess proscribed weapons or
materials
related to
them. The Commission’s concerns stem particularly from the
difficulties
encountered
in substantiating Iraq’s claims that, in 1991, in flagrant
violation of its
obligations
under resolution 687 (1991) it secretly destroyed large quantities
of these
prohibited
weapons and materials instead of declaring and handing them over
for
the
Commission’s verification.”101
216.
The report
stated that “large quantities” of prohibited items had been
“successfully
eliminated”,
but “relatively minor, but highly significant, quantities” of
proscribed items
remained
“unaccounted for”.
217.
On the basis
of new documents and draft disclosures provided by Iraq,
UNSCOM
concluded
that there had been “considerable progress” in some areas since
December
1995. Iraq
had disclosed information of great significance, especially
documents
which it earlier
said had been destroyed. There were, however, “significant
deficiencies
and
gaps”.
218.
In relation to
Iraq’s ballistic missile programme, Iraq had submitted a revised
draft
declaration
on 27 February 1996 which contained significant new
information, including
confirmation
that equipment UNSCOM had decided should be disposed of in April
1995
had been
for a major project (Project 1728) for the development and
production of liquid
propellant
engines for long-range missiles.
219.
Iraq had also
admitted that it had “carried out an undeclared programme to
modify
a Volga/SA2
surface-to-air missile system to a surface-to-surface application
with a
range of
over 100 kilometres”, including “flight tests and prototype
production of some
components”,
which should have been declared. As a result, an extensive
programme to
monitor
Iraq’s Volga missiles was required.
220.
UNSCOM
remained concerned about Iraq’s undeclared procurement of
prohibited
and
dual-use items.
221.
In January
1996, UNSCOM had investigated the recent delivery of “a large
number
of
sophisticated guidance and control components” which it assessed
were “used in
missiles
with ranges over thousands of kilometres”. Iraq had denied
acquiring the items
but
following official investigations it had confirmed that “its
authorities and missile
101
UN Security
Council, 11 April 1996, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on
the activities of the Special
Commission
established by the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 9 (b)
(i) of resolution 687 (1991)’
(S/1996/258).
62