4.3 | Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003

c. in cases where the content of an attributable product relies largely on intelligence,

the Assessments Staff should control and co-ordinate the preparation of

the document;

d. finally, the current arrangements for the handling of material from the intelligence

Agencies on an unattributable basis should continue as before.”

251. Asked about the origins and accuracy of the dossier published by No.10 during

Prime Minister’s Questions on 13 February, Mr Blair said that the part of the document

that dealt with intelligence was from intelligence sources and was accurate, as was the

document as a whole.104

252. Mr Blair “had said publicly that Dr al-Marashi should have been acknowledged

as a source”, and that the journal in which his article was published should have

been identified.105

253. The FCO told the FAC that lessons had been learned from the way the report

had been handled and systems had been put in place “to ensure that any intelligence

material which is made available publicly will first be authorised by the JIC Chairman”.106

254. In its report published on 7 July 2003, the FAC concluded:

“… the effect of the February dossier was almost wholly counter-productive. By

producing such a document the Government undermined the credibility of their

case for war and of the other documents which were part of it.

“… [B]y referring to the document on the floor of the House as ‘further

intelligence’ the Prime Minister – who had not been informed of its provenance …

misrepresented its status and thus inadvertently made a bad situation worse.

“… [I]t is wholly unacceptable for the Government to plagiarise work … and to

amend it without … highlighting the amendments … [I]t was fundamentally wrong

to allow such a document to be presented to Parliament and made widely available

without ministerial oversight.

“We recommend that any paper presented to Parliament … for the purpose of

explaining the Government’s foreign policy be signed off by a FCO Minister. We

further recommend that any FCO document presented to Parliament which draws

on official sources should include full transparency of sources, and attribution

where appropriate.”107

104 House of Commons, Official Report, 12 February 2003, columns 857-860.

105 Memorandum Campbell to Foreign Affairs Committee, 24 June 2003, ‘Memorandum from

Alastair Campbell’.

106 Memorandum FCO to Foreign Affairs Committee, 16 June 2003, ‘Memorandum from the Foreign and

Commonwealth Office’.

107 Ninth Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 2002-2003, 7 July 2003, The Decision to go

to War in Iraq, HC 813-1, paragraphs 136-139.

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