The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
between
Government departments” which had consumed significant amounts of
senior
48.
Departments
found it particularly difficult to find funding for activities that
emerged
“in‑year”
or appeared to fall between the boundaries of departments’
responsibilities
(such as
activities to promote political outreach or support the Iraqi
media). A number
of civilian
activities that Ministers had identified as a high priority –
including, in 2003,
support for
the Iraq Media Network and, in 2006, the first Better Basra Action
Plan –
were funded
late, and only in part.
49.
Departments
recognised in mid‑2003 that the arrangements for funding
civilian
activities
were not working well. In September, the Treasury rejected a
proposal from
departments
for a new pool for funding non‑military activity in Iraq, on the
grounds that it
might lead
to an increase in claims to the Reserve.
50.
The UK’s
deployment into Helmand province, Afghanistan, in 2006
prompted
departments,
led by the FCO, to revisit the arrangements for funding civilian
post‑conflict
activities.
Initial proposals focused on enhancing or complementing the GCPP
(on the
assumption
that the Treasury would not allow access to the Reserve for
non‑military
activities).
51.
At the same
time, MOD claims on the Reserve for UORs increased significantly
as
security in
Iraq deteriorated, expenditure on Afghanistan increased, and the
Government
provided
new equipment for the Armed Forces.
52.
The Treasury
continued to agree the MOD’s claims against the Reserve, but
by
April 2007
had concluded that the UOR programme had become a
straightforward
supplement
to the MOD’s Equipment Programme rather than a response to urgent
and
specific
requirements in a theatre of operations.
53.
In July 2007,
the MOD and the Treasury agreed a new arrangement for
funding
UORs
designed to shift the focus of the MOD’s Equipment Programme
towards current
operations.
The new arrangement was expected to be cost neutral for the
MOD.
54.
There were
also changes to the arrangements for funding non‑military
activities.
In July,
the Treasury announced the creation of a new Stabilisation Fund
(later
renamed the
Stabilisation Aid Fund – SAF) to fund immediate civilian support
to
military operations
(activities which had previously been funded from the
GCPP).
The GCPP
was combined with the Africa Conflict Prevention Pool to form the
Conflict
Pool.
New governance arrangements sought to link more closely
expenditure from the
SAF and the
Conflict Pool with UK strategy.
55.
The changes to
the arrangements for funding UORs did not affect operations in
Iraq,
which were
by this time generating fewer demands for UORs.
10
Public
hearing, 20 January 2010, pages 36–37.
578