The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
after
Exercise Internal Look, in December 2002, would have unpalatable
diplomatic
consequences.
990.
Mr Hoon’s
minute of 15 October was sent to Mr Straw, Mr Brown
and
Sir Andrew Turnbull,
and Mr Watkins’ advice of 29 October was sent to the
Private
Offices of
Mr Straw and Mr Brown and to Mr Bowen. The issues
were discussed in two
meetings
chaired by Mr Blair, on 17 October and 31 October, at which
Mr Straw was
present as
well as Mr Hoon and Adm Boyce.
991.
In the context
of questioning about the Government’s decision‑making
machinery
and whether
Mr Blair was being given military advice which addressed the
implications
and
challenges, Sir David Manning stated that he was sure that the
MOD was “intent on
giving him
the best advice they possibly could about the military
commitment”.391
992.
Mr Blair
had expressed his concerns about cost and Treasury officials had
raised
the issues
with Mr Brown, but Mr Brown was not at the meetings on 17
and 31 October.
993.
As Section 7
sets out, decisions of this importance, which raise a number
of
challenging
questions, are best addressed by a Cabinet Committee. Collective
and
regular
consideration by a small group of senior Ministers, whether or not
formally
designated
as a Cabinet Committee, would have been able to explore more
thoroughly:
•
what the UK
was seeking to achieve;
•
how its
national interests might best be served;
•
the options
available and their advantages, disadvantages and risks;
and
•
whether
offering Package 3 to the US at that time was the best option
in
the circumstances.
994.
There would
also have been advantages in ensuring the MOD analysis
was
examined by
a small group of senior officials before advice for Ministers was
finalised.
995.
Mr Blair
had told Cabinet on 24 October that “military options” would be
discussed
in due
time. Cabinet did not discuss military action until 17 March
2003.
996.
Following
the agreement to offer Package 3 to the US, the UK
military
preference
for land operations remained in the North although, by
early
November,
the US was suggesting that the UK should look at other
options.
997.
On 31 October,
Mr Hoon telephoned Secretary Rumsfeld to inform him of
the
decision to
offer Package 3 and that a UK contribution might comprise a
divisional HQ,
391
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, page 52.
324