The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
276.
The paper
noted that even a representative government could seek to
acquire
WMD and
build up its conventional forces, as long as Iran and Israel
retained their WMD
and
conventional armouries.
277.
The Cabinet
Office paper stated that the only certain means to
remove
Saddam
Hussein and his elite was to invade and impose a new government.
That
would be a
new departure which would require the construction of a coalition
and
a legal
justification.
278.
Examining the
internal position in Iraq, the paper stated:
•
“In the
current circumstances, a military revolt or coup is a remote
possibility.”
•
“Unaided,
the Iraqi opposition is incapable of overthrowing the regime.
The
external
opposition is weak,
divided and lacks domestic credibility. The
predominant
group is the Iraqi National Congress (INC) … The other
major
group, the
Iraqi National Accord (INA) espouses moderate Arab socialism
and
is led by
another Shia, Ayad Allawi. Neither group has a military capability,
and
both are
badly penetrated by Iraqi intelligence …”
•
“The
internal
opposition is small
and fractured on ethnic and sectarian
grounds.
There is no effective Sunni-Arab
opposition.
There are 3-4m Kurds
in northern
Iraq … divided between two main parties, the Patriotic Union
of
Kurdistan
(PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). These groups
have
an interest
in preserving the status quo, and are more interested in
seeking
advantage
over the other than allying against Saddam …”
•
“The Kurds
do not co-operate with the Shia-Arabs
who form 60
percent of the
population
… Most Shia would like to have a greater say in Iraqi
government,
but not
necessarily control: they do not want secession, Islamic autonomy
or
Iranian
influence.”
279.
Three options
for achieving regime change by military means were
identified,
which were
described as “a new departure which would require the construction
of a
coalition
and a legal justification”. Those were:
•
Covert
support to opposition groups, internal revolt by the Kurds and
Shia, and
the
defection, or at least acquiescence, of large sections of the
Army.
•
An air
campaign providing overt support to opposition groups, leading to a
coup
or
uprising. Pressure on the regime could be increased by massing
ground and
naval
forces and threatening a land invasion.
•
A
full-scale ground offensive to destroy Saddam Hussein’s military
machine and
remove him
from power. An invasion would need to be preceded by a
major
air
offensive to soften up Iraq’s defences and be sufficient to pose a
credible
threat to
Baghdad to persuade members of the Sunni military elite that
their
survival
was better served by deserting to the coalition than staying loyal
to
Saddam.
That would require fewer forces than Operation Desert Storm
because
436