The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
330.
The official
also advised that:
“A major
constraint to DFID’s programme, not highlighted in the I-CAP
review, is the
limited
capacity of Iraqi institutions to drive forward reform and
reconstruction. This is
exacerbated
by the short political horizons inherent in the Transitional
Administrative
Law (TAL),
which militate against far-reaching reform. Corruption is also
becoming
increasingly
apparent and might become the main constraint on reconstruction
and
development
if security were to improve significantly.”
331.
The I-CAP
review comprised short reports on:
•
political
and economic progress in Iraq;
•
progress on
reconstruction. Deteriorating security – identified as a key risk
in the
I-CAP – was
a major constraint. Projected costs of UK staff working in Iraq
for
2005/06
were more than £500,000 per person-year;
•
the
activities of other donors;
•
key
challenges for reconstruction in 2005/06. Those included the
limited
life-span
of the IIG and the ITG, which affected their ability to implement
major
reforms;
and
•
examples of
the impact of DFID projects in 2004/05.
332.
The I-CAP
review stated that:
“DFID’s
work programme has evolved to take account of the difficult
security
situation
and the absence of some traditional donors. The objectives and
approach
set out in
our I-CAP remained valid.”
•
continue to
promote broader and more effective international
support;
•
continue
and deepen work at the national level to build Iraqi capacity
and
encourage
greater Iraqi leadership of reconstruction; and
•
“expand and
accelerate” DFID’s programme in the South, where high
levels
of poverty
persisted.
334.
There are no
indications that other government departments or
international
partners
contributed to the production of the I-CAP review.
335.
The I-CAP
review submitted to Mr Benn was not the “substantial review”
promised
in the
I-CAP. In particular, it did not:
•
provide a
comprehensive assessment of the political, economic and
social
context in
Iraq, reflecting the major changes since the I-CAP had
been
produced,
including the existence of a sovereign Iraqi Government (with its
own
priorities
and constraints) and the profound impacts of growing
insecurity;
252