1.1 | UK
Iraq strategy 1990 to 2000
•
Iraq had
increased its declarations on the number of special warheads for
the
Al Hussein
missile, filled with chemical or biological agents, several
times.
UNSCOM had
established that the minimum number produced was 75, and
that
five
additional warheads had been used for trials. It also “had evidence
of the
probable
existence of a number of additional special
warheads”.
•
UNSCOM had
been unable fully to confirm Iraq’s unilateral destruction of 45
of
those
warheads.
•
Accounting
for proscribed warheads would “greatly increase” UNSCOM’s
ability
to report
with confidence that Iraq did not possess a proscribed missile
force.
•
More work
was required to account for Iraq’s indigenous production
of
proscribed
missile systems.
325.
In relation to
Iraq’s chemical weapons programmes, UNSCOM was “still
investigating
the veracity” of Iraq’s claims that it had unilaterally destroyed
weapons
and agents.
326.
Iraq had not
declared the removal and concealment of some production
equipment
from
al-Muthanna until August 1997 and its plans required further
clarification.
327.
The “most
important” outstanding issues were:
•
“accounting
for special missile warheads”;
•
the
“material balance of 155mm mustard shells”;
•
the “extent
of the VX programme”; and
•
the
rationale for the acquisition of various types of chemical
weapons.
328.
Iraq had
declared in June 1996 that 550 artillery munitions filled with
mustard agent
had been
destroyed during the 1991 Gulf Conflict but had not yet provided
evidence of
that
destruction.
329.
UNSCOM had
been unable to verify the destruction of Iraq’s stocks of
precursor
chemicals
for the production of VX. In addition, while Iraq had declared,
after 1995, that
the project
had failed and no large-scale production had ever taken place,
UNSCOM
had
“recently obtained further sufficient evidence” that Iraq had
“succeeded in acquiring
VX
production capabilities”.
330.
Important
progress had been made, but Iraq would need to provide “much
more
and
accurate material and related access … relevant to the warheads and
VX questions”
before
UNSCOM would be able to “report positively on
disarmament”.
331.
UNSCOM
reported to the Security Council on 6 October that Iraq’s
total production
and
holdings of CW agents could not be verified:
•
“Over a
period of seven years Iraq had provided three formal FFCD (full
and
final
complete declarations) and about 20 sets of clarifications
…”
81