10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
882.
Mr Alexander
sent Mr Miliband and Mr Browne an update on progress
on
Mr Brown’s
economic initiatives on 21 December.517
He advised
that the success of the
Basra
Development Forum was due in part to the reconciliation of Prime
Minister Maliki
and
Governor Waili, but also reflected:
“… years of
often invisible effort in building up capacity of provincial
government
to spend
Iraqi resources for reconstruction and development … This is the
right
approach –
helping to set up Iraqi institutions to spend Iraqi resources, and
it is
bearing
fruit.”
883.
Mr Alexander
continued:
“My visit
also confirmed that we cannot view economic development in
isolation
from
politics or security. They are inter-related and require an
HMG-wide effort. We
should
therefore guard against terminology that suggests a civilian or
economic
surge will
continue to be the driving force in determining Iraq’s stability
and
prosperity
… We need a conscious broadening of the effort across HMG,
the
mechanisms
for which need to be discussed; and we need to ensure that our
civilian
and
military plans for Iraq are co-ordinated. We also need to be clear
about what we
are aiming
to achieve.”
884.
Basra province
transferred to PIC on 16 December.518
All of the
four provinces
within
MND(SE) had now transferred to PIC.
885.
Mr Brown
met Prime Minister Maliki in the UK on 3 January
2008.519
On
reconciliation,
Mr Brown said that he wanted to see rapid progress on the
Hydrocarbons
Law and
local elections. On economic reconstruction, he encouraged Prime
Minister
Maliki to
appoint Iraqi nationals to support Mr Wareing’s work. Prime
Minister Maliki
replied
that he would speak to Mr Salih; he also confirmed that he
would double
Basra’s budget.
886.
Lt Gen Rollo
reported on 14 January that the Iraqi Minister of Finance had
signed
off the
first eight Japanese soft loans.520
The UK was
working with the US Embassy
to ensure
that the first loan, which covered Umm Qasr port, was taken
forward
immediately.
Lt Gen Rollo would continue to track the issue, but he remained of
the view
that the
“real answer” was a Basra Development Office in
Baghdad.
887.
The 16 January
meeting of the ISG considered a draft strategy for
Iraq.521
Mr McDonald
underlined the importance that Mr Brown attached to the
economic
517
Letter
Alexander to Miliband, 21 December 2007, [untitled].
518
BBC
News, 23 March
2009, Timeline:
UK Troops in Basra.
519
Letter
Fletcher to Carver, 3 January 2008, ‘Prime Minister’s Bilateral
with Prime Minister of Iraq,
3 January’.
520
Minute
Rollo to CDS, 14 January 2008, ‘SBMR-I’s Weekly Report (283) 14 Jan
08’.
521
Minute
Cabinet Office [junior official] to McDonald, 17 January 2008,
‘Iraq Strategy Group, 16 January’.
339