The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
145.
General Sir
Richard Dannatt, Commander-in-Chief Land Command, wrote
to
Mr Des
Browne, the Defence Secretary, on 31 August setting out his most
serious
concerns.97
His letter
focused on the pressures on Service Personnel:
“… as an
Army, we are running hot, and our operational deployments are well
above
planned
levels set out in current Defence Planning Assumptions … you should
be
aware that,
in my opinion, the demands of the organisation are currently
greater
than our
ability to provide satisfactorily for the needs of the individuals
… Quite
properly,
we often talk about an implied contract – the ‘military covenant’ –
that as an
Army we
have with our soldiers and their families and I fear that it is
somewhat out
of
balance.”
146.
Gen Dannatt
stated that the concerns might seem misplaced, given that
current
“outflow
levels” of personnel (which he described as the classic gauge of
morale) were
low. But
the cumulative effect of the high tempo of operations, short tour
intervals, hectic
training
and activity between tours, and under-manning gave rise to “a
severe risk akin
to a
cliff-edge experience”.
147.
Gen Dannatt
identified several pre-emptive actions to prevent any increase
in
outflow,
including:
“Away from
the field, I sense that basic pay for our more junior people is
becoming
an issue,
as are some allowances, particularly those that are related to
operational
deployment.
I am not at all sure that a take home pay of £1,150 a month is fair
return
for a
month’s work in Helmand or Basra. But it is the standard of both
single and
family
accommodation when our people are back home that is probably the
most
emotive
issue …”
148.
Improvements
in those areas would require a “modest shift” of resources from
the
Equipment
Programme into the Short-Term Programme.
149.
Gen Dannatt
took up post as Chief of the General Staff the following
month.
150.
Gen Dannatt
told the Inquiry:
“When the
military covenant is in balance, then the engine [the Army] can do
a
lot of
work. When the covenant is out of balance, we have problems. I
think we
progressively
got out of balance as the amount of work we were being asked
to
do increased
through 2005 and 2006.
“I say this
not in any shape or form as a criticism of any of my predecessors,
but
merely as a
reflection of the additional work that we were being asked to do as
a
consequence
of decisions taken to stay in Iraq until we had successfully
completed
our
operations there, but also take on Afghanistan as
well.
97
Letter
Dannatt to Browne, 31 August 2006, [untitled].
28