The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
16.
Mr Blair’s
letter pointed out that advice from the Chiefs of Staff was “at
odds with
what Paul
Bremer had told John Sawers, David Manning and David Richards’ a
few
days
earlier” and had “reminded the MOD that the stakes in Iraq were
very high, given
the danger
that we might be approaching a point of ‘strategic
failure’”.
17.
On 27 May,
Mr Kofi Annan, the UN Secretary-General, named Mr Sérgio
Vieira de
Mello as
his Special Representative to “lead the United Nations effort in
Iraq for the next
18.
Prior to his
appointment, Mr Vieira de Mello was the UN High Commissioner
for
Human
Rights and Mr Annan explained that he would return to that
post at the end of
four
months.
19.
Reporting from
Baghdad on 27 May, Mr John Sawers, the Prime Minister’s
Special
Representative
on Iraq, explained that:
“The
Americans are going off the idea of an early National Conference,
as are many
of the
Iraqi parties. Bremer has recommended to Washington that he
appoints the
Interim
Administration. I have warned him of the danger of veering away
from the
SCR
[resolution 1483], and have suggested a two stage process – an
appointed
Advisory
Council soon, transforming into the Interim Administration once it
can be
approved by
a representative Iraqi gathering.”7
20.
Mr Sawers
reported that Ambassador Bremer proposed that the drafting of
a
new
Constitution should be directed by another, Iraqi-led, body. His
ideas were “with
Washington”
for consideration.
21.
Mr Sawers
commented that:
“There are
practical arguments for Bremer’s approach, and we do need the
Coalition
to keep
tight control at this stage. We also need to find a way of staying
within the
terms of
the SCR and keeping Vieira de Mello with our plans; and of
providing for a
progressive
transfer of responsibilities from the Coalition to the
Iraqis.”
22.
On 29 May,
Mr Simon McDonald, Principal Private Secretary to Mr Jack
Straw, the
Foreign
Secretary, wrote to Mr Nicholas Cannon, Mr Blair’s
Assistant Private Secretary
for Foreign
Affairs, in preparation for a visit to Iraq by
Mr Blair.8
23.
Mr McDonald
advised that a core requirement for the UK was for the
political
process to
be compatible with operative paragraph 9 of resolution 1483 (2003).
That
meant the
Iraqi Interim Administration (IIA) should be set up by the Iraqi
people, with the
help of the
CPA and working with the UN Special Representative.
6
UN Press
Release, 27 May 2003, ‘Transcript of Press Conference by
Secretary-General Kofi Annan and
Special
Representative for Iraq, Sérgio Vieira de Mello, 27
May’.
7
Telegram 20
IraqRep to FCO London, 27 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
8
Letter
McDonald to Cannon, 29 May 2003, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
210