The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
996.
Mr Brown’s
Private Secretary sent him Dr Turner’s advice on 11
April.489
In
his
covering
email he reported having spoken to both Sir Nigel Sheinwald and to
the White
House and
commented:
“They know
we are irritated, but ‘a lot of people here think the UK has failed
in
Basra’. I
told Bush’s people that … your priorities were Iraq … [and] you
would have
positive
public messages on the three part plan for Iraq …”
997.
On 11 April,
Mr Browne’s Private Secretary wrote to No.10 with “a note on
the
implications
if we were to decide to reduce our military presence in Iraq and
Kuwait to
c[irca]
1,750 later this year”, provided at Mr Brown’s
request.490
998.
The letter
explained that current planning was conditions-based but rested
on
the
assumption that the UK would not leave Basra until the training of
the Iraqi Army’s
14th Division
had been completed and Basra Airport had been transferred to
Iraqi
control.
Both were expected during the latter part of 2008, though the
Charge of the
Knights had
set back progress.
999.
Although there
was no cross-Whitehall “template” for the UK’s relationship
with
Iraq, and
no detailed planning had been done “on whether a 1,750 figure made
sense
militarily”,
the main military contribution could include:
•
training
the Iraqi Navy;
•
helping to
run the military staff college and junior officer
training;
•
continued
MiTTing activity; and
•
some niche
capabilities – including ships in the northern Gulf and fast jets
–
provided an
appropriate legal basis could be agreed once resolution
1790
expired at
the end of the year.
1000.
The Private
Secretary wrote, “early planning suggests that it should be
possible to
meet all of
these tasks with rather fewer than 1,750 people in Iraq and
Kuwait”.
1001.
The letter
continued:
“Moving
from our current presence in Basra (c[irca].4,100 personnel) to
this new
model would
be a complex and demanding operation … Our provisional
assumption
… is that
we would need around six months to plan and implement
withdrawal
from the
Basra COB … Our preparations would become apparent very quickly
to
the
Americans but a shorter timescale would carry major operational,
morale and
presentational
consequences.
“The
broader implications would need to be worked through. Our initial
sense is
that even
with a significant residual commitment it would have an inevitable
impact
on UK-US
relations … We would need to work hard not only to minimise
damage
489
Email
Fletcher to Brown, 11 April 2008, ‘Iraq – Handling
Bush’.
490
Letter
Ferguson to Fletcher, 11 April 2008, [untitled].
368