3.4 |
Development of UK strategy and options, late July to 14 September
2002
12.
The MOD stated
that it was “clear that the US plan of attack from the South” did
not
“need
British land forces”:
“… in the
time available there is very little scope for the preparation and
integration
of British
land forces into the US order of battle; moreover the logistic
space
available
in Kuwait, with five divisions worth of equipment and logistics
support
entering
through only one airhead and a single port would already be
confined …”
13.
Adm Boyce
recommended three options:
•
Package
1: an
“in‑place support package” using forces already in the
region
and US use
of UK bases.
•
Package
2: an
“enhanced support package” comprising Package 1 and
additional
air and maritime forces. That package could include forces that
would
be “of
particular interest to the US because of their own deficiencies,
e.g. mine
clearance
vessels and air‑to‑air refuellers for their carrier‑based
aircraft”. While
no
conventional land forces could meet the timescales for the
deployment of
maritime
and air forces: “Special Forces could be deployed very rapidly to
match
US
timescales and priorities. This is likely to be very attractive to
US planners,
and their
contribution to success would be significant.”
•
Package
3: a “discrete
UK package” based on deployment of an armoured
division
which the MOD envisaged would be used in northern Iraq, in addition
to
the forces
in Packages 1 and 2. The MOD stated that a force that was
“credible”
would be
required: “Even to create uncertainty in the mind of Saddam”, and
the
contribution
of a division “would probably require command and control at
Corps
level. The
UK might consider providing an armoured division either as part of
a
US‑led
Corps or as part of a larger coalition force possibly led by the UK
using
the
framework of the NATO Allied Rapid Reaction Corps
[ARRC].”
14.
The MOD
highlighted problems with:
•
the concept
of a “Running Start”;
•
the
fragility of the logistic chains; and
•
vulnerability
to chemical or biological weapons.
15.
The MOD stated
that “thinking about dealing with the aftermath of a
successful
attack
remains sketchy”.
16.
Finally, the
MOD drew attention to the funding which would be required once
a
decision in
principle was made to participate in military
activity.
17.
Mr Geoff
Hoon, the Defence Secretary, attached “two large caveats” to
all
three options.
•
First, the
timescales were “best planning estimates” and made
“sweeping
assumptions”
about basing, transit routes, and overflights. They also
assumed
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