6.2 | Military planning for the invasion, January to March 2003

718. The paper stated that, to be effective, all targets identified as being active, or

historically used as regime command centres, must be disabled. Issues of proportionality

were to be “judged against the proportionality of the entire set […] against the military

necessity of achieving denial of WMD use”.

719. Mr Hoon wrote that the targeting paper would “form part of the guidance to

senior military commanders” to whom authority was delegated and that they would “take

decisions based on the same target clearance process” that was used for Ministerial

decisions on targeting and “on the basis of the legal advice available directly to them”.

720. The paper informed, but was “not a substitute” for, the Targeting Directive, which

formed part of the CDS Directive to the CJO for Op TELIC.

721. The paper stated that any delegation would be exercised in accordance with

international law and with the benefit of legal advice. Mr Hoon wrote that agreement of

the paper was “independent of any overall decision to authorise the use of force” and

would have no impact on the UK’s operational policy until such a decision was taken.

722. On 13 March 2003, an official sent AM Burridge a 2001 policy paper entitled

‘Joint Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment for UK Forces’, which was described

as the “benchmark” for the process by which target authorisation and delegation should

be conducted.260

723. The paper provided comprehensive guidance on definitions and principles of

targeting, and contained detailed annexes on:

• legal considerations for “targeteers”;

• guidance on calculation of collateral damage predictions and casualty estimates;

• process maps for decision-making;

• a pro forma targeting checklist; and

• guidance on Battle Damage Assessment.

724. The paper stated that IHL principles were:

• the need to be satisfied that the target was required to fulfil a military objective;

• that all reasonable steps had been taken to avoid and in all cases minimise

collateral damage to civilians and civilian objects; and

• that the anticipated military advantage outweighed the expected collateral

damage.

260 Minute Harris to UK NCC, 13 March 2003, ‘Targeting Lexicon’ attaching Paper, 23 January 2001,

‘Joint Targeting and Battle Damage Assessment for UK Forces’.

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