9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
–– The
Commander of the MNF will retain sole operational control of
the
Multi‑National
Forces in Iraq and report to the UNSC along the lines
of
arrangements
for ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] in
Afghanistan.
––
Multi-National Forces will also require operational control of
Iraqi forces …
––
Iraqi sovereignty must be preserved by ensuring a role for the
Iraqi Government
at the
strategic level and with provision for consultation over all
elements of
implementation
of the Security Agreement, though without relinquishing
MNF
operational
control …
–– The
Agreement should emphasise the role of the Multi-National Force
in
building
the capacity of Iraqi forces to take over security
responsibilities
through continued
programmes of recruitment, training, mentoring,
monitoring, and
advice.”
695.
The paper
explained that a further UN resolution enshrining the terms of
the
Security
Agreement would be an important safety net. Although resolution
1511 provided
an adequate
legal basis for the political transition and the presence of the
MNF, the UK
saw value
in a new resolution that endorsed:
•
the
TAL;
•
the
timetable in the 15 November Agreement;
•
the
Security Agreement; and
•
the powers
of the newly-appointed UN Special Adviser
Mr Brahimi.
696.
Mr Blair
annotated the document “this is excellent and seems the right
strategy”.
697.
In ‘Iraq: The
Next Six Months’ the FCO also outlined that the CPA’s
outreach
programme
was gaining momentum, and that there were some encouraging
indicators
that the
Sunni community was seeking to re-engage with the political
process.
698.
A new Council
of Sunni Communities – a grouping of Sunni religious leaders –
had
formed.
Members of the GC had held a large meeting with Sunni community
leaders the
previous
week in which the theme was national reconciliation. The FCO
indicated that
the UK
would continue to push this message, and the need for real
practical measures,
including
job creation, to underpin Sunni outreach.
699.
In a minute to
Mr Straw on 26 January, Mr Sawers highlighted the “real
risk” of
pushing
“Iraq so fast down the road to democratic politics that it crashes
in a welter of
intra- and
inter-communal violence”.382
700.
Sir Hilary
Synnott’s posting in Basra came to an end in January 2004. He
was
replaced by
Mr Patrick Nixon, former British Ambassador in Abu
Dhabi.
382
Minute
Sawers to Foreign Secretary, 26 January 2004, ‘Iraq: Political
Process’.
321