4.3 |
Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
127.
Section 4.2
sets out the material from SIS reports described as from “A new
source
on trial
with direct access” and issued to a small number of very senior
readers on
11 and
23 September. These stated that Iraq had accelerated the production
of chemical
and
biological agents and that Saddam Hussein was determined to
maintain his CBW
capability.
Mr Blair and others were told that the SIS expected to receive
substantial
additional
material on Iraq’s chemical and biological programmes through the
same source.
128.
Sir Richard
Dearlove was reported to have briefed Mr Straw “in general
terms
only, on
the hoped for dump of material from [codename] and the importance
it would
have” on 27
September.45
Mr Straw
had “asked several questions about [codename’s]
motivation
and whether he was genuine”. Sir Richard had told him that the
answer to the
first was
“money and ideology”, and that the answer to the second was
“yes”.
129.
When he was
asked by the Inquiry about the questions raised by Mr Straw
about
the
sourcing for the report, SIS4 outlined the level of confidence that
SIS had had in the
source at
this point and the reasons for those views and set out the steps
which were
open to SIS
in these circumstances to validate the
intelligence.46
But he
explained that
he was
unsighted on the exact steps taken in this case.
130.
In early
October, questions were raised with SIS about the mention of
glass
containers
in the 23 September 2002 report.47
It was
pointed out that:
•
Glass
containers were not typically used in chemical munitions; and that
a
popular
movie (The
Rock) had
inaccurately depicted nerve agents being carried
in glass
beads or spheres.
•
Iraq had
had difficulty in the 1980s obtaining a key precursor chemical for
soman
[a chemical
agent].
131.
The questions
about the use of glass containers for chemical agent and
the
similarity
of the description to those portrayed in The
Rock had been
recognised by
SIS.48
There were
some precedents for the use of glass containers but the points
would
be pursued
when further material became available.
132.
A document
written on 11 November described the issue of acquiring the
promised
further
reporting as “reaching a crucial point” and that it was being
afforded “our highest
priority”.49
It also
said that Sir Richard Dearlove was “following progress of the
case”.
133.
On 13
November, Sir Richard Dearlove “updated” Mr Straw “on our
hopes to get
further
[codename] reporting”.50
Sir Richard
described “in outline terms only” the delays in
obtaining
the expected intelligence and, given its importance, possible steps
to retrieve it.
45
Minute
PS/C, 27 September 2002, ‘SOSFCA – WMD Discussions with C on 27
September’.
46
Private
hearing, Part 1, page 63.
47
SIS record,
7 October 2002.
48
SIS record,
8 October 2002.
49
SIS record,
11 November 2002.
50
Minute
PS/C, 13 November 2002, ‘SOSFCA – WMD Discussions with C on 13
November 2002’.
313