Previous page | Contents | Next page
4.3  |  Iraq WMD assessments, October 2002 to March 2003
127.  Section 4.2 sets out the material from SIS reports described as from “A new source
on trial with direct access” and issued to a small number of very senior readers on
11 and 23 September. These stated that Iraq had accelerated the production of chemical
and biological agents and that Saddam Hussein was determined to maintain his CBW
capability. Mr Blair and others were told that the SIS expected to receive substantial
additional material on Iraq’s chemical and biological programmes through the same source.
128.  Sir Richard Dearlove was reported to have briefed Mr Straw “in general terms
only, on the hoped for dump of material from [codename] and the importance it would
have” on 27 September.45 Mr Straw had “asked several questions about [codename’s]
motivation and whether he was genuine”. Sir Richard had told him that the answer to the
first was “money and ideology”, and that the answer to the second was “yes”.
129.  When he was asked by the Inquiry about the questions raised by Mr Straw about
the sourcing for the report, SIS4 outlined the level of confidence that SIS had had in the
source at this point and the reasons for those views and set out the steps which were
open to SIS in these circumstances to validate the intelligence.46 But he explained that
he was unsighted on the exact steps taken in this case.
130.  In early October, questions were raised with SIS about the mention of glass
containers in the 23 September 2002 report.47 It was pointed out that:
Glass containers were not typically used in chemical munitions; and that a
popular movie (The Rock) had inaccurately depicted nerve agents being carried
in glass beads or spheres.
Iraq had had difficulty in the 1980s obtaining a key precursor chemical for soman
[a chemical agent].
131.  The questions about the use of glass containers for chemical agent and the
similarity of the description to those portrayed in The Rock had been recognised by
SIS.48 There were some precedents for the use of glass containers but the points would
be pursued when further material became available.
132.  A document written on 11 November described the issue of acquiring the promised
further reporting as “reaching a crucial point” and that it was being afforded “our highest
priority”.49 It also said that Sir Richard Dearlove was “following progress of the case”.
133.  On 13 November, Sir Richard Dearlove “updated” Mr Straw “on our hopes to get
further [codename] reporting”.50 Sir Richard described “in outline terms only” the delays in
obtaining the expected intelligence and, given its importance, possible steps to retrieve it.
45  Minute PS/C, 27 September 2002, ‘SOSFCA – WMD Discussions with C on 27 September’.
46  Private hearing, Part 1, page 63.
47  SIS record, 7 October 2002.
48  SIS record, 8 October 2002.
49  SIS record, 11 November 2002.
50  Minute PS/C, 13 November 2002, ‘SOSFCA – WMD Discussions with C on 13 November 2002’.
313
Previous page | Contents | Next page