The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
they have
systematically embedded into state security structures,
particularly the
Ministry of
Interior (MoI) …
“V.
Sectarian tension will not diminish: in some areas the violence has
gained its own
momentum.
MoI forces, the police and, to a lesser extent the Army, have their
own
ethnic and
sectarian fault-lines: if conflict deepens, their cohesion would be
in doubt,
particularly
in areas of religious diversity such as Baghdad. They would be
unable to
cope in
such areas without significant and close Multi-National Force
support.”
662.
The JIC
concluded that the issues facing Iraq’s politicians in the coming
months –
federalism,
de-Ba’athification and the influence of the Shia militas in the
security
forces –
were ones that were likely to increase sectarian divisions still
further, despite
the
anti-sectarian rhetoric of the politicians and that: “Reversing the
growing trend of
sectarianism
will take many years.”
663.
Dr Reid’s
Private Secretary wrote to Mr Blair’s Private Secretary on 6
April in
response to
his letter of 31 March which set out Mr Blair’s views about
accelerating
664.
Dr Reid’s
Private Secretary wrote:
“The
Secretary of State agrees that we need to avoid the perception that
we are
pressing
too hard on transition timescales for national reasons, but he is
anxious
that we do
as much as possible to avoid further delays …”
665.
The Private
Secretary explained that MND(SE) had submitted its first
assessment
results for
the four southern provinces to the MNF command in Baghdad; the
results
for
Muthanna, in particular, were encouraging. It was unlikely that MNF
command
would reach
a decision before 22 April, when Gen Casey would meet his
Divisional
Commanders.
666.
The timetable
for military transition was discussed at the Iraq Strategy Group
on
7 April,
with Mr Martin Howard, MOD Director General Operational
Policy, reporting that
while the
Governor of Muthanna had signed off the assessment for transition
there, the
Governor of
Maysan had not yet done so.318
667.
Mr Asquith
reported that the rocket attacks on Basra Palace on 4 April and
the
continuing
non-co-operation by the local authorities there meant that some of
the civilian
staff were
unable to operate effectively and an audit had indicated that there
was “no
added
value” from keeping them there. The FCO and DFID planned to
recommend to
their
Ministers a drawdown of civilian staff from Basra Palace until
conditions on the
ground had
improved.
317
Letter
Beadle to Banner, 6 April 2006, ‘Iraq: Transition’.
318
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 10 April 2006, ‘Iraq
Strategy Group: 7 April 2006’.
598