10.1 | Reconstruction: March 2003 to June 2004

734. Gen Jackson called on Baroness Amos on 18 September.

735. Baroness Amos’ briefing for the meeting advised that, while the relationship

between the military and DFID was “strengthening”, there had been a number of

misunderstandings, many of which stemmed from the difference in approach between

the Overseas Development Administration (ODA) and DFID:

“… the military could draw on ODA financing in support of UK political (and thus

military) objectives. The International Development Act now ties DFID down to much

more stringent conditions for funds disbursement …”403

736. The briefing warned that Gen Jackson might draw unfavourable comparisons

between the UK’s reconstruction effort in Kosovo and Iraq:

“Without the CPA delivering … There is a reasoned argument that HMG should

have planned to support its military effort with a civilian ‘colonial’ effort, and

[Gen] Jackson may be of the view that DFID should have mounted a bilateral UK

operation similar to Kosovo, carrying out immediate infrastructure work, repairing

schools, hospitals and so on. Not only was this not the strategy adopted by

HMG [Her Majesty’s Government], but a similar DFID effort would not have been

possible. Kosovo’s size, population, level of local consent, and interim governance

arrangements were entirely different. A wider ‘colonial’ role is neither DFID’s role nor

our comparative advantage.”

737. During the meeting, Gen Jackson said that the International Development Act (IDA)

had created “conceptual and procedural difficulties which worked against a centralised

HMG effort”.404

738. Baroness Amos responded that, while the IDA had changed the way that

DFID worked, it was still able to work with the military effectively. There was a need to

prepare and plan better for post-conflict reconstruction “particularly in the very fragile

transition stage”.

739. Baroness Amos continued:

“We had all been failed by the CPA … HMG’s decision to put so much faith in the

CPA was compounded by our failure to understand the US way of doing things …

DFID’s £20m infrastructure project in the South in expectation of a further and

larger funding allocation for infrastructure from CPA(Baghdad) was moving in the

right direction – but we could not be complacent and had to make contingency

arrangements in case CPA funding did not come through.”

403 Minute DFID [junior official] to PPS/Secretary of State [DFID], 16 September 2003, ‘Meeting with

General Sir Michael Jackson, Chief of the General Staff – Thursday 18 September’.

404 Minute DFID [junior official] to PPS/Secretary of State [DFID], 23 September 2003, ‘Meeting Note:

General Sir Michael Jackson CGS’.

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