4.4  |  The search for WMD

the intelligence leading up to the war. The UK would continue to argue that, after the

FAC, ISC and Hutton inquiries, another was unnecessary.

612.  Mr Scarlett discussed Dr Kay’s statements with a senior US official later on

26 January.338 He reported to No.10 that Dr Kay’s comments might make Mr Tenet’s

appearance before the Senate Intelligence Committee in early March more difficult.

Mr Tenet was therefore considering a statement of his own on the intelligence

underlying the NIE.

613.  Mr Scarlett also reported that he had been told Mr Duelfer might pass through

London on his way to Baghdad in about a week, and that it looked likely that there would

be an interim ISG report in late March or early April.

614.  Under the headline “Bush Backs Away From His Claims About Iraq Arms”, The

New York Times reported on 27 January that, now Dr Kay was suggesting Iraq’s WMD

had been disposed of before the invasion, President Bush had declined to repeat his

earlier claims that WMD would be found.339

615.  Reporting on the public debate in the US on 27 January, Sir David Manning wrote:

“Kay is briefing the media extensively. His main theme is that, although the

Administration have acted with integrity and were correct to invade Iraq, there has

been a major intelligence failure on Iraq WMD.”340

616.  Sir David observed that President Bush’s public line had become “a little more

nuanced”, leading the press to claim the White House was “in retreat”. Sir David

reported that on 27 January:

“Bush was sounding a bit less bullish and a bit more nuanced (‘I think it’s very

important for us [the US Administration] to let the Iraq Survey Group do its work so

we can find out the facts and compare the facts to what was thought … [T]here is no

doubt in my mind that Saddam Hussein was a grave and gathering threat to America

and the world’).”

617.  Sir David concluded:

“From the point of view of a White House political strategist, Kay’s line looks

probably not too unhelpful: it is lowering public expectations of future WMD

finds, increasing the pressure for this issue to be brought to closure before the

election season gets going in earnest after Easter, and placing the blame for any

false prospectus for war firmly with the intelligence agencies rather than with

the Administration.”

338  Letter Scarlett to Rycroft, 26 January 2004, ‘Iraqi WMD: Conversation with [CIA]’.

339  The New York Times, 28 January 2004, Bush Backs Away From His Claims About Iraq Arms.

340  Telegram 125 Washington to FCO London, 27 January 2004, ‘Iraq WMD: US Public Debate,

27 January’.

545