15.1 | Civilian personnel

and take an aggressive approach to further reducing our footprint wherever and

whenever possible (including downsizing the IPA contingent itself).

“This is a difficult balancing act: our civilian staff play a critical role in securing the

progress necessary to complete our overall mission. Pulling too many out too quickly

will undermine our chances of success, and potentially prolong the need for our

presence. But we will aim to get everyone into fully hardened accommodation by

31 July. In early August our military will leave Basra Palace and we can expect IDF

rates at the Air Station [COB] to increase further, as it becomes the sole target for

such attacks.”

510.  The IPU explained that, in the meantime, the FCO was taking steps to reduce the

risk to those accommodated on the Skylink site. If personnel based there were injured

or killed, the FCO could be open to claims of negligence if it failed to demonstrate that

it had fulfilled its duty of care obligations. The FCO Legal Advisers’ view was that the

measures taken and ArmorGroup’s explicit written agreement to the arrangement would

put the FCO on strong ground in refuting such claims.

511.  The IPU warned that if the FCO was to stop use of the Skylink accommodation

it would have to remove the vast majority of the IPAs from Basra or make “deep cuts”

to other parts of the mission, severely disrupting work in Basra at a critical time.

512.  On 30 April, there was a direct hit on the ArmorGroup IPA office.339 The unhardened

room was not occupied at the time and there were no casualties. Two IPAs in the

adjacent cabin were unharmed. On the basis of reports from the OSM, Mr McDonald

issued instructions to Basra that all personnel under FCO duty of care should move

to hardened accommodation immediately.

513.  The British Embassy Office Basra sent proposals for a reduction in personnel

“to a level that should provide adequate security and acceptable living conditions for

all personnel operating from the COB, while maintaining operational effectiveness”.

The FCO would reduce from 12 to 10 and the Control Risks security team from 32

to 24, subject to a review by the Overseas Security Adviser later in the month. Those

reductions would allow the police teams to remain at existing levels and allow three

members of the PRT to return to Basra, increasing its numbers from 11 to 14.

514.  Mr Benn expressed concern to DFID officials that the appropriate levels of

protection were not yet in place.340

515.  Officials explained that all staff under DFID’s duty of care had been under hard

cover for some time: a pre‑condition for their move from the BPC to the COB. FCO

and DFID staff were, however, still eating in the unhardened military dining facility.

339  Minute IPU [junior official] to PS/PUS [FCO], 1 May 2007, [untitled].

340  Email [DFID junior official] to Baugh, 2 May 2007, ‘Basra: Move of the British Embassy Office’.

335