3.3 | Development of UK strategy and options, April to July 2002

concluding that there would be difficulties in using that route as the means to establish

a legal base for action in spring 2003. It had concluded:

“So either we need to conclude that military action will be deferred until winter

2003/4 or we need to establish a justification/legal base which does not rely on

the return of the weapons inspectors.”110

259. The Cabinet Office paper stated:

“It was just possible that an ultimatum could be cast in terms which Saddam would

reject (because he is unwilling to accept unfettered access) and which would not

be regarded as unreasonable by the international community … failing that (or an

Iraqi attack) we would be most unlikely to achieve a legal base for military action

by January 2003.”111

260. The detailed consideration of legal issues prepared by FCO Legal Advisers and

issued with the Cabinet Office paper of 8 March was circulated again as an Annex to

the 19 July paper.112

261. Mr McKane advised that the legal basis for military action had deliberately

been left open.

262. In a separate minute on the same day, Mr McKane advised Sir David Manning:

“The paper is rather thin in its treatment of the legal base. This is because a

fuller treatment would have resulted in options being closed off – in particular the

justification based on self defence – by legal advisers.”113

263. An international coalition would be necessary to provide a military platform

and would be desirable for political purposes.

264. The Cabinet Office paper stated that an international coalition would be

necessary to provide a military platform and would be desirable for political purposes.114

The “greater the international support, the greater the prospects of success”.

265. Military forces would need agreement to use bases in the region. Without UN

authorisation, there would be problems securing the support of NATO and EU partners,

although Australia “would be likely to participate on the same basis as the UK”. France

“might be prepared to take part if she saw military action as inevitable”. Russia and

China might “set aside their misgivings if sufficient attention were paid to their legal and

110 Paper [draft] Cabinet Office, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’ attached to Minute McKane to Bowen,

16 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.

111 Paper Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’.

112 Paper FCO, [undated], ‘Iraq: Legal Background’ attached to Paper Cabinet Office, 8 March 2002,

‘Iraq: Options Paper’.

113 Minute McKane to Manning, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.

114 Paper Cabinet Office, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq: Conditions for Military Action’.

47