The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
357.
The record of
the meeting between Mr Blair and Vice President Cheney
confirms
that most
of the discussion addressed US concerns, in the context of Al
Qaida’s pursuit
of WMD,
about the need for action to deal with the threat posed by Iraq and
the potential
link
between terrorism and WMD.131
358.
Mr Blair
confirmed that “it was highly desirable to get rid of Saddam”; and
that:
“Arguing
that this was in the interests of regional stability was probably a
better
line even
than the threat from WMD … The UK would help … as long as there
was
a clever
strategy, and one that worked. This meant building up the case
against
Saddam
carefully and intelligently.
“… If
action was taken suddenly against Saddam now, the international
community
would ask
what had changed. It was important to take enough time to put
Saddam
in the
wrong place over inspections and compliance with UNSCRs. This would
play
an
important part in convincing international opinion to rally to the
idea of regime
change.
“… we also
needed a proper strategy for dealing with the Iraqi
opposition.
“… We
should also concentrate much more on the appalling nature of
Saddam’s
regime.
“… As far
as military strategy was concerned, we must ensure that our forces
were
equipped to
finish the job quickly and successfully … the Arab world … did not
want
a campaign
launched against him [Saddam] unless we were determined to see
it
through to
a successful conclusion.
“… it was
particularly important to guard against the law of
unintended
consequences
… We must ensure that a campaign to bring about regime
change
in Iraq did
not inadvertently destabilise other countries in the Middle East.
The Arab
street was
very angry … We needed to generate a sense that we were
determined
to promote
a peace process that would give justice to the Palestinians … If
this
problem
were not tackled successfully, it would dominate the way that the
Arabs
thought
about the Iraq problem.”
359.
Following
confirmation that the US were considering deploying ground troops
and
a
discussion of whether the US was looking for a wide international
discussion, Mr Blair
understood
that the US would welcome whatever contribution the UK could make,
but it
was not
looking for other help. Mr Blair also said that:
“… the
diplomacy surrounding action against Saddam would be important. We
must
avoid
giving any appearance of having taken a decision and then making
everything
else fit
round it.”
131
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 11 March 2002, ‘Conversation between the Prime
Minister and
Vice President
Cheney, 11 March 2002’.
450