6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
“In
parallel, the (Cabinet Office) Information Strategy Group (ISG)
will be considering
the
information aspects. This will focus very much on the co-ordination
of cross-
government
strategic messages relating to Iraq, rather than day-to-day
media
handling.
It will meet on an ad hoc basis, and will be chaired by Alastair
Campbell
or, in
his absence, Desmond Bowen.”224
396.
At the first
meeting of the AHGI, departments agreed the proposed
composition
and remit,
adding the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs
(DEFRA)
to the
list of participants “to cover environmental
aspects”.225
397.
Asked by the
Inquiry to explain the Whitehall arrangements, Sir David
Manning
said that
the restricted group chaired by him or his deputy included “all
those who had
access to
the most sensitive intelligence”.226
It was not
focused solely on Iraq, and often
had other
pressing issues to deal with but:
“... it was
an opportunity … to report on the progress that different
departments
had made,
on the latest assessment that may have come out of the agencies,
the
political
issues that were being confronted by the Foreign Office, the
difficulties that
the
Ministry of Defence might be encountering and so on and so
forth.”
398.
Sir David
explained that the AHGI drew in those with less or very little
access to
sensitive
intelligence.
399.
Mr Bowen told
the Inquiry that, when the AHGI started its work in September
2002,
the context
was “a serious policy commitment to deal with weapons of mass
destruction
in Iraq”.
Conflict was just one of “any number of outcomes”.227
400.
At the end
of August 2002, Sir Michael Jay identified the need to put
the
FCO’s Iraq
work on a new footing.
401.
Mr Ricketts
was put in charge of ensuring the FCO’s approach was
“suitably
dynamic and
coherent”.
402.
Between
September and mid-November 2002, the FCO’s principal
preoccupation
on Iraq was the negotiation of UN Security Council
resolution
(UNSCR)
1441.
403.
Mr Straw
and Mr Ricketts were heavily engaged in those
negotiations.
404.
On 30 August,
Mr Gray sent Sir Michael Jay a draft minute from Sir Michael
to
Mr Straw,
setting out the steps Sir Michael was taking to “draw together
threads of
activity on
Iraq” in the FCO.228
The draft
explained that, in addition to intensifying work
224
Letter
Drummond to Wright, 18 September 2002, ‘Iraq
Co-ordination’.
225
Minute
Drummond to Manning, 23 September 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on
Iraq’.
226
Public
hearing, 30 November 2009, page 45.
227
Public
hearing, 7 December 2009, page 10.
228
Minute Gray
to PS/PUS [FCO], 30 August 2002, ‘Iraq’ attaching Minute [draft]
PUS [FCO] to Secretary
of State
[FCO], 30 August 2002, ‘Iraq’.
179