The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

Humanitarian Affairs Department (CHAD) was working up preliminary costings, but had

“no consumer for this product”.

199.  Mr Fernie asked Dr Brewer for her advice on how to proceed:

“Do we need to take this up at a higher level in CO [the Cabinet Office] or HMT

[the Treasury]? Or do as CO says and start circulating some large‑ish figures

around Whitehall?”

200.  Dr Brewer replied on 5 December.131 She advised that she had spoken to

Mr Peter Ricketts, the FCO Political Director, who had been:

“… slightly more willing to acknowledge that the likely costs … should be factored

into the decision‑making process. But I got no sense at all that the FCO would either

push for this or support us in doing so. Their sense is that the Prime Minister’s mind

will be made up by other factors.”

201.  Dr Brewer suggested that the issue could be raised by Mr Chakrabarti with

Sir David Manning and Permanent Secretaries, or by Ms Short at Cabinet.

202.  DFID officials reported the lack of progress to Ms Short on 10 December.132

Ms Short agreed that officials should raise US and DFID cost estimates at the next

AHGI, and directed that DFID officials should intensify discussions with the Treasury

on costings.

203.  There is no reference to a discussion on this issue in the records of the

13 December 2002 and 10 January 2003 meetings of the AHGI.133

204.  The Inquiry has seen no indications that DFID raised this issue again.

205.  In mid‑December 2002, a DFID official advised Ms Short that the MOD did not

seem to have recognised that, for a period after any conflict, the UK military would “find

themselves in the frontline in caring for injured and vulnerable civilian populations”.134

The military would need to be resourced to fulfil this responsibility. Dr Brewer said that

she would speak to the MOD.

206.  At the end of December 2002, the focus of the Chiefs of Staff and UK military

planners switched from northern to southern Iraq, creating a contingent liability that the

UK would be responsible for the post‑conflict occupation and administration of a UK

Area of Responsibility (AOR) in the region around Basra.

207.  The Cabinet discussed Iraq on 16 January 2003.135

131 Minute Brewer to Fernie, 5 December 2002, ‘Iraq: Contingency Planning’.

132 Minute Bewes to Fernie, 13 December 2002, ‘Iraq’.

133 Minute Dodd to Manning, 19 December 2002, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’; Minute Dodd to Manning,

13 January 2003, ‘Ad Hoc Group on Iraq’.

134 Minute DFID [junior official] to Fernie, 13 December 2002, ‘Iraq’.

135 Cabinet Conclusions, 16 January 2003.

476