The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
283.
Mr Blair
agreed separate advice from Mr Powell, building on the
proposals
for a
strategy leading to regime change set out in three earlier notes
(two in
November
2001 and one in March 2002).
284.
The
elements of Mr Powell’s “road map” were similar to the proposals
in
the Cabinet
Office paper.
285.
Mr Powell
advised that the UK and the US “must do it right” and not
rush
into action.
286.
Mr Powell
submitted separate advice on 19 July, suggesting that Mr Blair
should
send a Note
providing a context for Iraq to President Bush before the expected
briefing
on US
military plans on 4 August, and recommending a telephone
call.118
“I think we
need a road map to getting rid of Saddam, drawing parallels as far
as
possible
with his [President Bush’s] success in Afghanistan, including the
following
elements:
a.
We will be
there when the US takes the decision to act, but …
b.
We need to
set an ultimatum
as we did
to the Taliban in Afghanistan.
At a
certain point we need to make it clear that unless Saddam agrees
to
inspectors
on our terms – anyone, any time, anywhere – by a certain
date
we will
act.
c.
We need to
establish a legal basis. More difficult for us than for
them.
It needs
to be based on WMD rather than terrorism or regime
change.
d.
We need at
least neutrality in the region before we can act … If we want
to
base our
troops in the region this will mean a real effort on the MEPP
…
e.
We need to
make the case. We need a plan and a timetable for
releasing
the papers
we have prepared on human rights abuses, WMD etc. We
need
to have the
sort of Rolls Royce information campaign we had at the end
of
Afghanistan
before we start in Iraq.
f.
We need a
convincing military plan. What we know about so far is
not
convincing
…
g. And we
need a plan for the day after … We need to be working on
this
now …
“Lastly, we
should not rush this. We must do it right. If we are not ready in
January
2003 then
we may need to wait for autumn 2003. Of course Saddam may give
us
a break
before then that we can exploit, but slow deliberate planning like
your father
in the Gulf
war is the best bet.”
118
Minute
Powell to Prime Minister, 19 July 2002, ‘Iraq’.
50