The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

there involving weapons of mass destruction, it is unthinkable that we would not be

involved in some way, as we were 10 years ago.

“Secondly, it is important because there is a UN resolution … that Saddam must

give up those weapons … [I]f … we were to allow Saddam to breach the UN will

and did nothing about it, the consequences would be felt not just in respect of Iraq.

We would send a message across the world that this was a serious issue, but one

about which we were prepared to do nothing … We are members of the international

community and we believe it is important that Britain make sure that Saddam

complies with those UN resolutions. That is why Britain has a vital national interest in

ensuring that the resolution is implemented.”105

308. Mr Hoon told Parliament on 18 December that the UK was making

contingency preparations, including the deployment of a naval Task Group

for exercises; and that there might be additional maritime deployments in the

New Year.

309. In a statement to Parliament on 18 December on contingency preparations for

military operations against Iraq, Mr Hoon reported that he had “authorised a range of

steps to improve readiness”.106 He also referred to the planned deployment of a naval

Task Group, led by HMS Ark Royal, to the Gulf and Asia‑Pacific region, in early 2003,

which remained “available for a range of potential operations if required”.

310. Mr Hoon added that the UK was also considering the deployment of “additional

maritime forces early in the new year to ensure the readiness of a broad range of

maritime capabilities, should they be required”.

311. The development of plans for a possible UK contribution to US‑led military action

after Mr Blair’s decision at the end of October to offer ground forces to the US for

planning purposes, and discussions with the US, are addressed in Sections 6.1 and 6.2.

312. The JIC’s initial Assessment on 18 December of the Iraqi declaration

stated that:

• Intelligence from late November indicated that Iraq’s aim was to overload

UNMOVIC with information.

• Iraq “continued to claim that it has not conducted any illicit WMD or

ballistic missile programmes since 1991”.

105 House of Commons, Official Report, 18 December 2002, columns 841‑842.

106 House of Commons, Official Report, 18 December 2002, columns 845‑846.

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