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The Report of the Iraq Inquiry
Any proposal for an operation which breached those parameters (which is not
currently in the offing) would be subject to the usual Ministerial consideration.”141
259.  Mr Webb told the Inquiry that, with regard to planned action to degrade Iraq’s
air‑defence system:
“… a degree of caution … set in during the spring of 2001 … sensing that there
had been this reaction in the region, I think the senior commanders didn’t want
to propose more of that if they didn’t have to. As a result, some of the patrolling
reduced; in other words, a decision was taken that if we didn’t know where we
might face this risk over part of the southern No-Fly Zone, we wouldn’t patrol there
for a while.
“So the operational commanders reduced the scope of the operation under their
discretionary authority and with our support, rather than proposing a repeat of those
situations. And that went on for a few months.”142
Discussions with the US
260.  The Cabinet Office took the lead in co-ordinating inter-departmental efforts
to define the nature of future sanctions arrangements.
261.  Papers were produced on:
how a more focused sanctions regime could be established (‘Iraq: Handling the
Sanctions Issue’);
how controls to prevent Iraq re-arming would operate after the suspension of
sanctions;143
establishing better border controls;144 and
the application of financial sanctions against Iraq.145
262.  On 16 March, Mr Sawers sent Dr Rice a copy of the UK’s draft ‘Contract with the
Iraqi People’ and a paper entitled ‘Iraq: Handling the Sanctions Issue’.146
263.  The paper on sanctions highlighted the danger that the forthcoming resolution
on rolling over the OFF programme would “present the friends of Iraq in the P5 with an
141  Letter Miller to Sawers, 30 March 2001, ‘Iraq’.
142  Public hearing, 24 November 2009, page 147.
143  Letter Ross to McKane 16 March 2001, ‘Iraq Post Suspension Controls’ attaching Paper UKMIS
New York, 16 March 2001, ‘Iraq Sanctions Suspension UK Discussion Paper’; Letter Patey to Macaire,
28 March 2001, ‘Iraq: Sanctions Suspension’, attaching Paper, [undated], ‘Iraq Sanctions Suspension
UK Discussion Paper’.
144  Letter McKane to Macaire, 30 March 2001, ‘Iraq: Better Border Controls’ attaching Paper Cabinet
Office, March 2001, ‘Iraq: Better Border Controls’.
145  Letter Casale to Marriott, 2 April 2001, ‘UK’s Application of Financial Sanctions Against Iraq’ attaching
Paper, [undated], ‘Iraqi Financial Sanctions: Options for Change’.
146  Letter Sawers to Rice, 16 March 2001, ‘Iraq’ attaching Paper, [undated], ‘Contract with the Iraqi People’
and Paper, [undated], ‘Iraq: Handling the Sanctions Issue’.
242
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