The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
608.
DFID also
stated that the military would need adequate plans to deal with
the
civilian
impact of CBW use before the UN and NGOs arrived. More generally,
the role
of UN
agencies and NGOs would be determined by the extent of UN cover.
There were
also
“severe doubts about the adequacy of US humanitarian
preparations”.
609.
Mr Blair’s
question about the plan for addressing humanitarian issues
was
answered in
one sentence:
“DFID is
planning to work primarily through UN agencies, unless extra
financial
resources
are available, in which case a more active bilateral role in
any
UK‑controlled
zone could be considered.”
610.
Mr Blair
raised the importance of a UN “badge” with Gen Franks
on
25 February.
611.
He told
Parliament later the same day that the UN must have a “key role”
in
post-conflict
Iraq and that discussions were under way on exactly what that
role
would
be.
612.
Sir David
Manning explained to Dr Rice that Mr Blair attached importance
to
the UN’s
role, but was clear that UN involvement must not be at the expense
of
efficient
administration and effective reconstruction.
613.
On 25
February, Mr Blair told Gen Franks that he “still hoped that
the UN could be
brought on
board” and that: “In any post-Saddam administration, the UN ‘badge’
would
help pull
the international community, including the Arabs and European
public opinion
614.
Mr Blair
and Gen Franks also discussed the possibility that “an occupation
could
work in
several ways on a continuum from a US occupation of Japan model
downwards”
and that
“it was important to work on the details, to avoid any perception
of a US
occupation”.
615.
Mr Watkins
informed Mr Hoon (who was due to meet Gen Franks in Qatar
on
26 February)
that, during a meeting earlier in the day, Gen Franks had told Adm
Boyce
that Iraq
would need to be under Coalition control for some time, during
which there
would need
to be discussion with the UN on establishing a UN
mandate.264
Gen
Franks
had added
that, contrary to press speculation, the US was not seriously
considering
anything
along the lines of post-Second World War Germany or Japan. He had
also
agreed with
a comment from Mr Webb that, in order to convince regional
opinion of its
intent, the
US needed to start talking to the UN, but the US did not want to do
anything
263
Letter
Cannon to Owen, 25 February 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s meeting
with General Franks’.
264
Minute
Watkins to Secretary of State [MOD], 25 February 2003, ‘Meeting
with General Franks:
26 February’.
418