10.4 |
Conclusions: Reconstruction
•
in May
2005, when DFID chose not to undertake the substantive review of
its
Country
Assistance Plan for Iraq to which it was committed;
•
in October
2005, when the US adopted a Clear‑Hold‑Build strategy,
including
increased
support for Iraqi institutions and the deployment of
PRTs;
•
in 2007, in
response to the US surge and Mr Brown’s focus on
economic
development
initiatives in Basra; and
•
in 2008, in
response to the improved security situation in Basra following
the
Charge of
the Knights.
121.
Under the
leadership of Mr Benn and Mr Chakrabarti, DFID missed several
clear
opportunities
to:
•
review its
approach and strategy in Iraq to ensure it was making the
greatest
possible
contribution to the reconstruction of Iraq and to the UK’s
broader
objectives;
and
•
work within
Whitehall to encourage the Government to review the UK’s
broader
approach
and strategy.
122.
Energy
security was one of the UK’s “fundamental interests” in relation to
Iraq
throughout
the period covered by the Inquiry.37
The region
accounted for 33 percent of
the world’s
oil supply.
123.
As Section 3
makes clear, the UK’s decision to take military action in Iraq was
not
driven by
economic considerations or potential commercial
benefits.
124.
The UK’s
concerns in relation to Iraq’s oil in the run‑up to the invasion
were:
•
the
possible impact of military action on oil prices; and
•
to maximise
the contribution that Iraqi oil revenues could make to
financing
Iraq’s
reconstruction (reducing the risk that the UK would need to make
a
substantial
contribution).
125.
The US
Department of Defense led planning to restore the oil sector before
the
invasion.
The UK did not participate in that planning, and only become aware
of it shortly
before the
invasion began.
37
Paper FCO,
January 2001, ‘Iraq: A Fresh Look at UK Interests’.
547