4.1 | Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002

415. Following discussions in Washington, Mr Webb discussed the time Iraq would

need to acquire a nuclear weapon with Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, Chief of the Defence

Staff (CDS), and AM French on 20 March.181

416. A DIS paper, “What does Iraq need to do to get the bomb quickly?” was produced

later that day.182

417. Referring to the Assessment of 15 March, the DIS stated:

“Although there is very little intelligence, the JIC judges that Iraq is still pursuing a

nuclear weapons programme. Intelligence indicates that scientists were recalled to

work on a nuclear weapons programme in the autumn of 1998, but it is not known

if large scale development work has yet recommenced. Procurement of dual use

items over the last few years could be used in a uranium enrichment programme.

But we have no definitive intelligence that such items are intended for a nuclear

programme.”

418. Addressing the question “What does Iraq have now?”, the DIS stated that the

Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) had concluded that Iraq had “made significant

progress in designing a nuclear device” before 1991:

“Many aspects of a simple design had been studied, although the high explosives

needed to detonate the device had not been fully developed. More sophisticated

concepts were being considered to produce a smaller and lighter device, capable of

missile delivery, but it is unlikely that much progress has been made … Iraq will have

retained documents, drawings and expertise.

“… Iraq still needed to complete aspects of its design and, in particular, to validate

the high explosives system. It is unlikely that much of this would have been done

before IAEA inspectors left in December 1998 for fear of detection. However, if all

the key scientists had been recalled … they could have reconstituted the programme

and further developed warhead designs since then. This would not necessarily

have been detected by intelligence.

“Iraq also has some possible platforms to deliver a suitable nuclear device.

Its Russian made jet aircraft … could probably be adapted [to] carry a simple

nuclear bomb … Any former SCUD missiles that could be assembled could take

a more sophisticated device. However, the remaining … Al Hussein missiles

would not be suitable.”

181 Minute CDI to Policy Director, 21 March 2002, ‘Iraq – Nuclear Weapons’.

182 Minute DIS [junior official] to DI ST, 20 March 2002, ‘What does Iraq need to do to get the bomb

quickly?’

89