9.2 | 23
May 2003 to June 2004
98.
Mr Hoon
told the House of Commons in a Written Ministerial Statement
on
11 June
that:
“Overall,
25,000 UK servicemen and women have returned from operations in
the
Gulf – more
than half those originally deployed. Some 17,000 servicemen
and
women
currently remain in the region.”35
99.
Mr Hoon
said that following further withdrawals and roulements, including
the
replacement
of HQ 1st (UK) Armoured Division by HQ 3rd (UK) Armoured Division,
the
number of
UK land forces in Iraq would reduce to around 10,000 by
mid-July.
100.
In addition to
land forces, the UK’s maritime presence would be retained at
the
existing
level (two frigates, a nuclear-powered submarine and two support
vessels) and
its air
presence would reduce to eight Tornados plus “a number of”
supporting aircraft
and 18
helicopters.
101.
When the
AHMGIR met on 12 June, Lord Goldsmith advised that:
“It was not
clear whether the Interim Administration currently envisaged was
entirely
consistent
with the resolution [1483] … The resolution does not confer full
legislative
powers on
the Coalition and therefore individual proposals must be judged on
their
merits. If
the Interim Administration was under direct Coalition control its
powers
would be
limited by the Geneva and Hague Conventions and resolution
1483.”36
102.
Lord Goldsmith
undertook to speak to his US counterpart, and to write to
Mr Blair
explaining
his concerns. He would also advise on the legality of currency
reform.
103.
In the course
of the meeting, Ministers observed that UN engagement in
the
political
process was vital (with DFID offering funding to strengthen
Mr Vieira de Mello’s
office) and
that the US was still not fully committed to the involvement of
women in the
Iraqi
political process.
104.
The AHMGIR
noted that it had been decided that the UK area of military
operations
would be
expanded to cover four governorates, to match the area of
CPA(South).
Ministers
agreed to take forward measures to improve the synergies between
the UK-led
military
division in the South, and CPA(South).
105.
Closing the
meeting, Mr Straw commissioned for the next meeting “a short
Iraq
strategy
paper agreed at UK official level prior to seeking agreement with
the US”.
106.
On 12 June,
Mr Tony Brenton, Chargé d’Affaires at the British
Embassy
Washington,
wrote to Sir David Manning in the context of “considerable concern
around
Whitehall
that our views are not being taken sufficiently into account in the
formulation of
policy on
governing Iraq”.37
35
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 11 June
2003, columns 51-52WS.
36
Minutes, 12
June 2003, Ad Hoc Group on Iraq Rehabilitation
meeting.
37
Letter
Brenton to Manning, 12 June 2003, ‘Iraq: UK/US
Co-operation’.
223