The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

to play football without the quarterback”. The US was “therefore pulling out all the stops

at the UN”. The US fully understood the importance of the second resolution for the UK.

194. Sir Jeremy Greenstock advised that the US would not countenance the use of

benchmarks. That risked delaying the military timetable.91

195. Mr Blair told Cabinet on 6 March that the argument boiled down to the question of

whether Saddam Hussein would ever voluntarily co-operate with the UN to disarm Iraq.92

196. Mr Blair concluded that it was for the Security Council to determine whether Iraq

was co-operating fully.

197. In his discussions with President Lagos on 6 March, Mr Blair stated that the US

would go ahead without the UN if asked to delay military action until April or May.93

198. In his report to the Security Council on 7 March, Dr Blix stated that there had

been an acceleration of initiatives from Iraq since the end of January, but they

could not be said to constitute immediate co-operation.94 Nor did they necessarily

cover all areas of relevance; but they were nevertheless welcome. UNMOVIC was

drawing up a work programme of key disarmament tasks, which would be ready

later that month, for approval by the Security Council. It would take “months”

to complete the programme.

199. Dr ElBaradei reported that there were no indications that Iraq had resumed

nuclear activities since the inspectors left in December 1998 and the recently

increased level of Iraqi co-operation should allow the IAEA to provide the Security

Council with an assessment of Iraq’s nuclear capabilities in the near future.

200. There was unanimity in calls for Iraq to increase its co-operation. But there was a

clear division between the US, UK, Spain and Bulgaria who spoke in favour of a further

resolution and France, Germany, Russia and China and most other Member States

who spoke in favour of continuing to pursuing disarmament through strengthened

inspections.

201. The UK, US and Spain circulated a revised draft resolution deciding that Iraq

would have failed to take the final opportunity offered by resolution 1441 (2002) unless

the Council concluded, on or before 17 March 2003, that Iraq had demonstrated full,

unconditional, immediate and active co-operation in accordance with its disarmament

obligations and was yielding possession of all weapons and proscribed material to

UNMOVIC and the IAEA.

91 Telegram 353 UKMIS New York to FCO London, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: 5 March’.

92 Cabinet Conclusions, 6 March 2003.

93 Letter Cannon to Owen, 6 March 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s Conversation with President of Chile,

6 March’.

94 UN Security Council, ‘4714th Meeting Friday 7 March 2003’ (S/PV.4714).

596