13.2 |
Conclusions: Resources
deployed,
in the sense that the Ministry of Defence had an access to the
Reserve that
was on a
different scale from the others [DFID and the
FCO]”.11
He
continued:
“... did
anyone sit down and say, ‘Well, this is the sum of money that we
have, this
ought to be
the balance?’ No, I don’t think they did. Should they have done?
Maybe,
but
actually it is ... very difficult to do.”
68.
The direction
in the Ministerial
Code that the
estimate of a cost of a proposal should
be included
in the memorandum submitted to Cabinet or a Ministerial Committee
applies
equally to
military operations. When evaluating military options it is
appropriate to
consider
financial risk alongside other forms of risk. While governments
will rarely wish
to preclude
options solely on the basis of cost, they must also recognise that,
over time,
cost may
become an issue and make it difficult to sustain a military
operation over the
longer
term.
69.
Section 9.8
addresses the difficulties that the Government faced in
converting
successive
UK strategies into action, in part because those strategies tended
to focus
on
describing the desired end state rather than how it would be
reached. On none
of the
occasions when UK strategy was reconsidered was a robust, costed
plan for
implementation
produced.
70.
Strategies and
plans must define the resources required to deliver
objectives,
identify
the budget(s) that will provide those resources, and confirm that
those resources
are
available.
71.
In developing
strategies and plans for civilian/military operations, a
government
should
address the impact of the different mechanisms used to fund
military operations
and
civilian activities and the extent to which those mechanisms
provide perverse
incentives
for military action by making it easier to secure funding for
agreed military
operations
than for civilian activities.
72.
A government
should also address its explicit and implicit financial policy
that, while
there
should be no constraint on the provision of funding for military
operations, it is
reasonable
that for the same civilian/military operation, departments should
find funding
for new
civilian activities from within their existing budgets, which are
likely to be fully
allocated
to existing departmental priorities.
73.
A government
is likely to embark on major civilian/military operations such as
Iraq
only
rarely.
74.
A government
should recognise that, in such operations, the civilian
components
(including
diplomatic activity, reconstruction and Security Sector Reform)
will be critical
for
strategic success, may be very substantial, and must be properly
resourced.
11 Public
hearing, 14 July 2010, page 41.
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