The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
“… people
will see that there is no doubt at all the United Nations
resolutions that
Saddam is
in breach of are there for a purpose. He [Saddam Hussein] is
without any
question,
still trying to develop that chemical, biological, potentially
nuclear capability
and to
allow him to do so without any let or hindrance, just to say, we
[sic] can carry
on and do
it, I think would be irresponsible.”
97.
President
Bush decided in the meeting of the National Security
Council
on 7 September
to take the issue of Iraq back to the UN.
98.
The UK was a
key ally whose support was highly desirable for the US. The
US
Administration
had been left in no doubt that the UK Government needed the
issue
of Iraq
to be taken back to the Security Council before it would be able to
participate
in military
action in Iraq.
99.
The objective
of the subsequent discussions between President Bush and
Mr Blair
at Camp
David was, as Mr Blair stated in the press conference before
the discussions,
to work out
the strategy.34
100.
Mr Blair
told President Bush that he was in no doubt about the need to deal
with
101.
Although at
that stage no decision had been taken on which military package
might
be offered
to the US for planning purposes, Mr Blair also told President
Bush that, if it
came to
war, the UK would take a significant military role.
102.
In his speech
to the General Assembly on 12 September, President Bush set
out
his view of
the “grave and gathering danger” posed by Saddam Hussein and
challenged
the UN to
act to address Iraq’s failure to meet the obligations imposed by
the Security
Council
since 1990.36
He made
clear that, if Iraq defied the UN, the world must hold
Iraq to
account and the US would “work with the UN Security Council for the
necessary
resolutions”.
But the US would not stand by and do nothing in the face of the
threat.
103.
Statements
made by China, France and Russia in the General Assembly
debate
after
President Bush’s speech highlighted the different positions of the
five Permanent
Members of
the Security Council, in particular about the role of the Council
in deciding
whether
military action was justified.
104.
The
Government dossier on Iraq was published on
24 September.37
It
was
designed to
“make the case” and secure Parliamentary (and public)
support
for the
Government’s policy that action was urgently required to
secure
Iraq’s disarmament.
34
The White
House, 7 September 2002, President
Bush, Prime Minister Blair Discuss Keeping the
Peace.
35
Minute
Manning to Prime Minister, 8 September 2002, ‘Your Visit to
Camp David on 7 September:
Conversation
with President Bush’.
36
The White
House, 12 September 2002, President’s
Remarks to the United Nations General Assembly.
37
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government,
24 September
2002.
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