10.2 |
Reconstruction: July 2004 to July 2009
control.568
An FCO
official cautioned against exaggerating Basra Airport’s success
–
flight
numbers had been dropping.
968.
NSID(OD) met
on 15 July, to discuss a paper prepared by Cabinet Office
officials
on UK
strategy in Iraq 2008/2009.569
969.
A DFID
official briefed Mr Alexander in advance of the meeting
that:
•
Dr al-Safi
was drawing the BDC into “party political wrangling”, questioning
the
validity of
its constitution and the UK’s role in relation to it. Prime
Minister Maliki
had
recently said that the BDC was “colonialist inspired”.
•
Meanwhile,
the BDC was drawing up a Basra Economic Development
Plan
which “in
practice … will be based on Wareing’s own ‘Key Goals’
document”.
•
Dr al-Safi
claimed to have allocated US$100m to 200 projects in Basra and
to
have hired
15,000 people for public works, but there was little evidence of
that
on the
ground. DFID was lobbying for the funds to be spent through
“transparent
channels”.
•
“Partners”
had raised concerns about the capacity of the Basra PRT. The
Deputy
Consul
General in Basra also headed the PRT and was “overloaded”. DFID
was
working
closely with the FCO to improve the capacity of “this FCO-led
team”.570
970.
A separate
DFID briefing for Mr Alexander stated that Mr Wareing had
identified
four issues
as “critical” to UK success in Basra:
•
Basra
International Airport. The UK needed to “define objectives for
success”
and clarify
responsibility within the UK Government for delivery.
•
UKTI
support for the Basra Support Office in Baghdad. UKTI had declined
to
fund a
post.
•
Improving
the performance of the Basra PRT. The US had suggested that it
was
under-performing
compared with other PRTs.
•
Improving
Iraq/Kuwait economic ties.571
971.
The DFID
briefing also stated that there was:
“… a
continuing view amongst some Iraqi politicians (i.e. Dr al-Safi and
– to a lesser
extent –
Prime Minister Maliki) … that reconstruction and development work
is not
proceeding
fast enough to capitalise on improved security. We are working
through
the Basra
Support Office in Baghdad and the PRT … to counter these views
…”
568
Minute
Jones to McDonald, 7 July 2008, ‘Iraq Strategy Group, 3
July’.
569
Paper
Cabinet Office Officials, 11 July 2008, ‘Iraq’.
570
Minute DFID
[junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 3 July 2008,
‘Information Note: Update
for the
Secretary of State’.
571
Email DFID
[junior official] to PS/Secretary of State [DFID], 11 July 2008,
‘Iraq Ministerial Trilateral
14 July
– Briefing’ attaching Briefing DFID, [undated], ‘Iraq (Trilateral)
– 14 July’.
353