3.1 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 9/11 to early January
2002
339.
Mr Blair
suggested that a “strategy for regime change that builds over time”
was
needed:
“until we get to the point where military action could be taken if
necessary”
without
losing international support and “facing a choice between massive
intervention
and
nothing”. That might comprise six elements.
340.
The first was
“Softening up” opinion by:
•
drawing
attention to Saddam’s breach of UN resolutions;
•
saying that
regime change was “desirable”, but “not yet setting it as a
military
objective”;
•
signalling
willingness to support opposition groups;
•
building a
regional coalition against Iraq; and
•
demanding
the return of weapons inspectors “without specifying military
action if
the demand
is not met, we let it be clearly seen that nothing is ruled out.
But our
time frame
is deliberately vague.”
341.
Mr Blair
commented that that would be “presentationally
difficult”:
“We need to
be very precise to avoid getting drawn into threats we are not yet
ready
to
implement. But we would be unsettling Saddam; possibly forcing
concessions out
of him …
and giving ourselves room for manoeuvre.”
In the
meantime, the US and UK would “continue to enforce the No-Fly Zones
on a more
intensive
basis”.
342.
The other
elements suggested by Mr Blair were:
•
Applying
“real pressure on Syria to stop the flow of Iraqi oil by closing
the oil
pipeline”,
clamping down on “Saddam’s illegal financial transactions”,
and
helping
Jordan. Turkey would also need to stop illegal oil
imports.
•
Bringing
“Russia on board, by ensuring their financial interests don’t
suffer
adversely”.
Withdrawal of Russian support would have a very negative
impact
on Saddam
Hussein.
•
Supporting
“opposition groups” and setting out an agenda for post-Saddam
Iraq
(the FCO’s
‘Contract with the Iraqi People’).
•
Mounting
“covert operations” in support of those “with the ability to
topple
Saddam”.
•
“When
the rebellion finally occurs we back it militarily.” That included
air support
and support
for uprisings. Mr Blair wrote: “What everyone in Iraq and
around
fears is
that we will start this action but not finish it. They need to
know, and
we need to
be clear, that if an uprising occurs, we are willing to act
militarily
in support.”
369