The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
conversations
with Mr Blair on 12 April.89
Ms Lloyd
commissioned a report on the looting
from the
MOD, in consultation with the FCO.
181.
On 13 April,
Mr Blair asked No.10 staff: “What are now the UNSCRs that we
need
and, on the
assumption we go piecemeal, in what order and within what
timing?”90
182.
The MOD
advised Mr Blair on 14 April that “UK forces will provide support
to those
Iraqis who
are trying to control the looting where they can”.91
There were
signs of the
locals
taking responsibility for their own property, and attempts by the
public to stop
looting
taking place. Advice on damage to culturally significant sites
during the invasion
is covered
in Section 6.2.
183.
On 14 April Mr
Cannon briefed Mr Blair that:
•
in Baghdad
the US military were reporting “while some looting is still going
on,
it is
exaggerated by the media”;
•
UK forces
had “announced a ‘zero tolerance’ policy for looters” in Basra,
where
the
situation was “targeted crime (e.g. bank robberies) rather than
generalised
looting”;
•
there were
“signs of locals [in Basra] taking responsibility for [their] own
property,
and
attempts by the public to stop looters”; and
•
in Az
Zubayr, looting was “reported to be in decline” and it had ceased
in
184.
In a statement
on 14 April Mr Blair told the House of Commons, “the regime
of
Saddam is
gone, the bulk of Iraq is under Coalition control and the vast
majority of Iraqis
are
rejoicing at Saddam’s departure”.93
Mr Blair’s
assessment of the situation in Iraq is
set out in
Section 8.
185.
Looking ahead,
Mr Blair told the House of Commons:
“Shortly,
we shall begin formally the process of Iraq’s reconstruction. We
see three
phases in
this. In the first phase, the Coalition and the Office of
Reconstruction
and
Humanitarian Assistance will have responsibility under the Geneva
and Hague
conventions
for ensuring that Iraq’s immediate security and humanitarian
needs
are met.
The second phase, beginning a few weeks after the end of the
conflict, will
see the
establishment of a broad-based, fully representative Iraqi Interim
authority.
Working
with the UN Secretary-General, Coalition military leaders and
others
will help
the Iraqi people to identify which leaders might participate in
that interim
89
Letter
Lloyd to Owen, 12 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s conversation
with President Chirac’ and
Letter
Lloyd to Owen, 12 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Prime Minister’s conversation
with President Bashar’.
90
Minute
Blair to Powell, 13 April 2003, ‘Note’.
91
Letter
Williams to Hallam, 14 April 2003, ‘Protection of significant sites
in Iraq’ attaching Report,
14 April
2003, ‘Protection of significant sites in Iraq’.
92
Minute
Cannon to Prime Minister, 14 April 2003, ‘Iraq: Law and Order
Situation’.
93
House of
Commons, Official
Report, 14 April
2003, columns 615-617.
160