6.4 |
Planning and preparation for a post-Saddam Hussein Iraq, mid-2001
to January 2003
•
Two
“problem multipliers” could make the situation worse: use of WMD by
Iraq
and an
attack on Israel.
515.
A month later,
on 24 October, Sir David Manning asked Ms Anna
Wechsberg,
No.10
Private Secretary: “I have failed to do anything with this. Should
I?”285
516.
On 1 November,
she replied that there was probably nothing in the paper
that
would be
new to him and that the AHGI had taken it into account in their
work.286
517.
By then, a
revised version, including comments from other departments, had
been
circulated
to the AHGI. It is not clear whether it was seen by Sir
David.
518.
‘Scenarios
for the future of Iraq after Saddam’, the second FCO paper for
the
AHGI,
listed scenarios under which Saddam Hussein might lose power, the
UK’s
four
“overarching priorities” for Iraq, and how those priorities might
be achieved.
519.
The FCO
recognised that the US would have the decisive voice in
any
externally-driven
regime change, but concluded that the UK should be able
to
exert
influence through its close relationship with the US, activity in
the UN and
its likely
role in any military campaign.
520.
The FCO
concluded that the UK should:
•
argue
strongly for Iraq to remain a unitary state;
•
avoid the
root and branch dismantling of Iraq’s governmental and
security
structures;
•
argue for
political reform, but not necessarily full democracy in the
short
term;
•
aim for a
political outcome to emerge from within Iraq;
•
recognise
the likely need for an interim administration and an
international
security
force.
521.
On 12
September, Sir David Manning had commissioned a paper from the FCO
on
what a
post-Saddam Hussein government might look like:
“If … there
is military action … what sort of government structures should we
try to
construct?
What should the relationship be between Baghdad and the regions
…?
Who might
make up this government?”287
285
Manuscript
comment Manning to Wechsberg, 24 October 2002, on Letter Sedwill to
Manning,
20 September
2002, ‘Iraq – Consequences of Conflict for the Region and
Beyond’.
286
Manuscript
comment Wechsberg to Manning, 1 November 2002, on Letter Sedwill to
Manning,
20 September
2002, ‘Iraq – Consequences of Conflict for the Region and
Beyond’.
287
Letter
Manning to McDonald, 12 September 2002, ‘Iraq’.
199