6.2 |
Military planning for the invasion, January to March
2003
•
The JIC
continued to judge that “in the face of death and the destruction
of his
regime”,
Saddam would “try to wreak as much havoc as possible”, but his
ability
to do so
could be limited.
•
There was a
“further risk … that CBW could become available to
extremist
groups
either as a last vindictive act by Saddam, or through the loss of
control
in the
final days of his regime”.
678.
In his account
of the campaign, Gen Franks wrote on 20 March:
“For the
past two days we had been receiving increasingly urgent
Intelligence
reporting
that Republican Guard units in Baghdad had moved south to
the
city of
al‑Kut – and that they had been issued mustard gas and an
unknown
679.
Most of the
issues raised at Mr Blair’s meeting on 6 March,
including
sectorisation,
remained unresolved as the invasion began.
680.
On 19
March, Mr Straw and Mr Hoon informed Mr Blair that:
•
the UK
would not be expected to contribute resources to anything
other
than
security during the first phase of the US post-conflict
plan;
•
it would be
premature to take a view on the merits of sectors for
the
following
phase; but
•
it would
help the US and military planners to agree on the UK’s
medium-term
contribution.
681.
The minute
concluded with a warning that Coalition partners were thin
on
the ground.
If the campaign did not go well, there would not be many who
were
prepared or
able to take part.
682.
Mr Straw
and Mr Hoon considered only the UK’s military presence in
Iraq.
They made
no reference to the civilian contribution.
683.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit expressed concern about the transition from a
primarily
military
effort to longer-term civilian-led reconstruction. It would be
necessary to
work hard
to avoid dependence on the Armed Forces to carry out civilian
tasks.
684.
Mr Straw and
Mr Hoon sent Mr Blair a joint minute on the UK military
contribution
to
post-conflict Iraq on 19 March.245
244
Franks T
& McConnell M. American
Soldier. HarperCollins,
2004.
245
Minute
Straw and Hoon to Prime Minister, 19 March 2003, ‘Iraq: UK Military
Contribution to
Post-Conflict
Iraq’.
495