1.2 |
Development of UK strategy and options, September 2000 to September
2001
290.
Mr Hoon
responded to Mr Cook’s letter on 14 May, stating that
the:
“Proposed
strategy [of 7 March] offers best prospect of retaining maximum
control
over Iraqi
revenues, impeding Baghdad’s ability to threaten its neighbours,
and
regaining
international support. But need to be realistic about chances of
speedy
implementation.
Difficulties of winning Russian and French support, and that of
front
line
states, very real.”153
291.
Mr Hoon stated
that there were only “limited grounds for optimism” that front
line
states
would implement new measures to clamp down on oil smuggling,
particularly in
the context
of regional attitudes to the intifada in the Palestinian Occupied
Territories.
292.
Mr Hoon
recognised Mr Cook’s “frustration with the No-Fly Zones”, but
disagreed
with his
position. In Mr Hoon’s view, the arguments for the NFZs, both
humanitarian and
defensive,
remained powerful and no less risky means of achieving those
objectives had
been
identified:
“Military
commanders are already charged with conducting the mission we
have
laid upon
them with minimum profile and risk. We have made progress over
the
past two
years bearing down on patrolling rates, reducing responses to
Iraqi
threats,
and making increased use of UAVs (Unmanned Aerial Vehicles) for
tactical
reconnaissance.
But I do not think that looking yet again at patrolling, with a
view
to reducing
or even ending it, would be productive. The arguments for
maintaining
the No-Fly
Zones are based on the assessed continued humanitarian
requirement,
the
importance of the southern Zone for the defence of Kuwait, and the
desire
to avoid
handing Saddam a victory which might undermine containment.
These
remain
powerful. While I accept that our view is not universally shared,
it remains
that the
Zones continue to be legally justified. We have asked officials to
identify
a better
(and less risky) means of achieving our objectives. Despite
exhaustive
scrutiny,
they have not found one: their consistent advice is that regular
patrols are
required
both to achieve the task and in order effectively – and safely – to
monitor
the threat.
Decisions about patrolling rates must remain the preserve of the
military
commander,
who must balance risk against exposure to the threat.”
293.
Mr Hoon
expressed his concern that the US Administration might pick up
“mixed
messages
about our commitment to continued military co-operation in this
area”, which
he believed
would be “very damaging” to the UK’s ability to influence US
thinking and
“unhelpful”
if it encouraged other P5 members to “introduce the future of the
Zones into
the
package”.
153
Letter Hoon
to Prime Minister, 14 May 2001, ‘Iraq’.
247