The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
c) Give
Bremer and the CPA the means to do their job … the right people
with the
right
skills …
d) Make
the regional network of CPA offices function – with access to
funds, good
communications,
inputs into central policy making …
3. A
clear, transparent Coalition decision-making process
…
b)
Development Fund for Iraq: we must get the decision-making right.
We
are jointly
responsible for this, legally and politically … Need transparent
and
accountable
mechanisms for setting Iraq’s budget, priorities for expenditure,
and
procedures
for disbursement – not just post facto auditing.
4. Power,
water and sewage
Repairs to
essential infrastructure, and provision of essential services,
must
be top of
CPA’s agenda. We need to speed up decision-making process
and
awarding of
sub-contracts …
5.
Restoring normal economic life …
6.
Security sector reform …”
441.
In the paper,
the IPU did not consider the resources that would be required
to
achieve
those targets or the particular role of the UK.
442.
Mr Straw
also attached a list of projects “which urgently need to be taken
forward
in and
around Basra”, and commented that he, Baroness Amos and
Mr Hoon were
“keen to
get cracking” on them.
443.
Mr Straw’s
letter was copied to Baroness Amos, Mr Hoon and other
Ministers.
444.
The Inquiry
has seen no indications that a paper on the Iraqi media was
produced
for
Mr Blair (as No.10 had requested on 3 June). The IPU paper
listing “30-day priorities”
identified
the need to “communicate to the Iraqi population what we have
already done
and what we
are trying to achieve”, but did not recommend any associated
actions.
445.
On the same
day, Mr Straw sent a personal letter to Mr Blair asking
him to raise
a number
of points “very forcefully” with President Bush,
including:
“Contracts:
As you know, the US are completely ruthless on favouring
US
companies,
and will not help UK companies unless you play hardball with
Bush.” 245
446.
Mr Straw
offered as an example of this behaviour, a Bechtel sub-contract to
install
170
megawatts (MW) of power capacity in Baghdad. Siemens UK had almost
secured
that
contract, but it had now “gone cold”.
245
Minute
Straw to Blair, 5 June 2003, ‘Iraq’.
80