6.1 | Development of the military options for an invasion of Iraq

740. Lt Gen Reith also advised that, while it was “too early to judge” how Phase IV

operations would be structured, it was “likely” that it would be “conducted under US

leadership, with territorial sectors allocated to national or multi‑national formations,

perhaps akin to the Balkans model”. The UK could be asked “to provide formation[s]

such as HQ ARRC, a UK Div HQ, or UKAMPHIBFOR [UK Amphibious Force] to oversee

national or multi‑national 1* formations”.

741. The Chiefs of Staff met on 2 October to discuss Iraq planning.302

742. Adm Boyce identified 15 October as a critical date for decisions, linked to whether

or not to participate in Exercise Internal Look, when the “fudge option” would no longer

be available. Some decisions might be delayed until the end of October, but that was an

“absolute end stop”.

743. The Chiefs of Staff “required a sitrep” which set out the key issues:

• Turkey’s position and its implications;

• an appraisal of whether the northern option was essential and the UK’s

participation;

• an explanation of the UK’s “coercive strategy and the Force on Mind gambit”;

• the “need to maintain the impetus on UNSCRs [UN Security Council resolutions]

using optimal, visible measures balanced against the resulting adverse PR”;

• the “unpredictable consequences” that might arise from the “Saddam factor”,

including his reaction to the spikes in US military activity and response options;

• Special Forces options; and

• the linkage between CENTCOM’s Exercise Internal Look and UK force planning.

744. The minutes recorded:

“Keeping options open would be difficult if relations with the US, including those

outside military circles, were not to suffer irreparably as a consequence and

CDS was adamant that this should be avoided if at all possible. There were also

implications for Force on Mind if the UK was perceived to be weakening its stance.

Phase IV considerations needed to be clearly understood, given that the inevitable

UK involvement might result in an even greater burden than war‑fighting per se.”

745. The Chiefs of Staff agreed that:

• Advice should be sent to Mr Hoon by 11 October.

• Lt Gen Reith should provide a paper “on land component options other than the

northern option”.

302 Minutes, 2 October 2002, Chiefs of Staff meeting.

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