4.1 |
Iraq WMD assessments, pre-July 2002
•
“Whether in
the meantime to publish the wider WMD Programme[s] of
518.
Mr McKane
wrote that the drafts took account of comments from the CIA but
had
not been
passed to other parts of the US Government. He also pointed out
that the
drafts had
not, at that stage, been “shared with DFID”.
519.
The
inter-departmental group advised:
“… that the
drafts should now be held in readiness for an appropriate moment
to
issue them.
Choosing that moment requires careful judgement. The
publication
of the
documents will be regarded by some as an indication that the
Government
has moved
closer to decisions on military action. On the other hand, as part
of
the
carefully co-ordinated exercise, they could serve to increase the
pressure on
Saddam
Hussein.”
520.
Mr McKane
reported that Mr Scarlett’s “strong preference” was
to:
“… keep the
WMD paper separate in order to preserve its status as a
considered
assessment
of what the intelligence says about Iraq’s existing WMD
capabilities –
in contrast
with the other two papers which are based on a mixture of
historical
material,
intelligence and reportage. Most of my group felt that this point
was
out‑weighed
by the advantages of presenting the three papers as a single
package,
in
particular because of the close relationship between the WMD and
the Weapons
Inspection
papers.”
521.
Mr McKane
also provided a copy of the separate draft paper addressing
wider
WMD
programmes of concern, stating that:
“The
Foreign Office, in particular, have advised that this paper should
not be
published
at the same time as the Iraq dossier, because of awkward
comparisons
which might
be drawn between the threat posed by other countries of
concern
and that
posed by Iraq. More generally, the FCO have concerns about the
quality
of the
‘evidence’ …”
522.
Mr McKane
concluded:
“Despite
the case for shining a spotlight on all states of WMD concern, the
balance
of the
arguments points towards delaying, at least until we are clearer
about the way
forward on
Iraq.”
523.
The draft
papers sent to Sir David Manning were largely identical to
those
produced by
the CIC on 3 June. The key changes to the WMD paper
were:
226
Minute
McKane to Manning, 21 June 2002, ‘Iraq: Public
Documents’.
105