The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
915.
Lt Gen Fry
emphasised that thinking had been driven by the tactical
advantages
of “a
certain degree of national independence” and the avoidance of the
need to
co‑ordinate
ground operations, not national ambition.358
916.
The
importance of influencing the US was stated repeatedly in the
papers
produced by
the MOD between the spring and autumn of 2002.
917.
Most MOD
witnesses suggested that the scale of the UK contribution
would
have an
impact on the degree of influence it would be possible to exert on
the US,
and in
particular on military planning.
918.
General
Sir Mike Jackson, Commander in Chief Land Command in 2002,
told
the Inquiry
that it was important to have a substantial land component to
influence US
planning
and its execution.359
919.
Asked by the
Inquiry if there was a direct relationship between the size of
the
contribution
and the degree of influence the UK would have, Gen Jackson
replied that
it was
not “a linear relationship”, but there was firm
connection.360
920.
Asked by the
Inquiry why the UK was “so keen to send a division”, Lord
Boyce
replied:
“I think it
was only by having something of that particular size that we
thought we
would have
a reasonable influence on how the Americans were going to
conduct
921.
Sir Kevin
Tebbit told the Inquiry:
“… unless
and until we had ground force commitments, we did not have the
inside
track on
planning or influence on the day after or the general conduct of
affairs,
including …
holding the Americans to a multi‑lateral track and … exhausting
the
arms
control route and trying to deal with this through
disarmament.”362
358
Public
hearing, 16 December 2009, page 21.
359
Public
hearing, 28 July 2010, page 9.
360
Public
hearing, 28 July 2010, page 10.
361
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 38.
362
Public
hearing, 3 December 2009, page 46.
314