The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
33.
In October
2001, the MOD conducted Exercise Saif Sareea II in
Oman.15
The
exercise,
which involved around 22,500 British Armed Forces personnel from
all three
services,
aimed to test the Armed Forces’ ability to conduct a medium scale
operation
over long
distances, in the post-SDR expeditionary force structure. It tested
the
principle
that the Joint Rapid Reaction Forces should be ready to conduct
expeditionary
operations
in any area of the world at short notice.
34.
In August
2002, the National Audit Office (NAO) published a report into the
exercise,
which
included a number of recommendations and identified a number of
problems to
35.
Much equipment
performed well, including Warrior Armoured Fighting
Vehicles
(AFVs) and
the C17 strategic lift aircraft.
36.
As a result of
pre-exercise reconnaissance, 4 Armoured Brigade had made
a
number of
recommendations for the modification of equipment, including
‘desertisation’17
of
Challenger 2 tanks. Despite the recommendation, the Permanent Joint
Headquarters
(PJHQ)
directed that the modifications would not be required given the
predicted climatic
conditions
in Oman.
37.
During the
exercise, a number of Challenger 2 tanks experienced difficulties
relating
to the hot
and dusty conditions. As a result, a much larger quantity of spare
parts was
required
and equipment availability was lower than expected.
38.
Sand filters
were fitted to the engines of Lynx and Chinook helicopters, as a
result of
lessons
learned from the 1991 Gulf Conflict. Overall helicopter
availability, however, was
55
percent.
39.
The MOD had
insufficient desert combat suits and desert boots for all
personnel. As
a result,
desert-specific clothing was issued only to personnel who would be
in theatre
for an
extended period. Standard issue boots were unsuitable for the task;
4 Armoured
Brigade’s
post-exercise report cited melting boots and foot rot as “a major
issue”.
40.
The NAO
reported that asset tracking systems remained weak. The Visibility
In
Transit
Asset Logging (VITAL) system, introduced as a result of NAO
recommendations
following
the first Gulf Conflict, had been operating “at 500 percent of its
originally
planned
capacity” by 2001. It was slow during the exercise, taking 15
minutes to find the
contents of
a single ISO container. As VITAL was not available at the point of
exiting the
UK, there
was no visibility of an item until it arrived in
theatre.
15
National
Audit Office, Exercise
Saif Sareea II, 1 August
2002, HC 1097.
16
National
Audit Office, Exercise
Saif Sareea II,
1 August 2002, HC 1097.
17
Modifications
to equipment that enable it to operate in desert
conditions.
8