The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
undertaking
two enduring intensive Medium Scale operations, as well as
maintaining
smaller
commitments elsewhere.”
577.
As a
consequence, “some capabilities are very stretched, notably
deployable
ground
troops and enables such as air transport, medical, intelligence and
surveillance”.
578.
The paper went
on to state:
“… the
military judgement is that we could sustain the deployment of
eight
battlegroups
between Iraq and Afghanistan (the current split being 6:2)
through
2007, but
not for much longer, and that it would not be feasible in 2007 to
exceed
eight in
total. This means that for as long as we retain six, or even five,
battlegroups
in Iraq it
will not be possible to contribute from UK resources the additional
two
battlegroups
for ISAF it is CDS’s strong advice we should provide.”
579.
The paper
concluded that, given the scale of commitment in Afghanistan, the
only
scope for
easing the pressure would be to reduce further in Iraq in 2008, and
so the
“continued
commitment to Basra Palace should not extend beyond Aug
07”.
580.
An MOD paper
on the possible UK response to revised force requirements
for
Afghanistan,
also written for DOP, was explicit that “delivery of additional
battalions for
Afghanistan
and the enabling assets required is dependent on Iraq force
levels”.296
581.
Departmental
briefs for Ministers attending DOP show that views were
divided
within
Whitehall. The MOD was concerned that the Cabinet Office and
Treasury were
trying to
postpone decisions on Afghanistan and told Mr Browne that the
force packages
proposed by
MOD were designed to meet NATO’s specific needs.297
582.
The FCO was
concerned that US commanders in Iraq were sceptical about
the
UK’s
assessment of progress in Basra and were concerned about UK
plans.298
583.
Cabinet Office
officials advised Mr Blair that the MOD’s assessment of Op
SINBAD
would
be:
“… drafted
to be as positive as possible. There have been some beneficial
short
and medium
term effects, such as stabilising the security situation, creating
new
employment
opportunities, successful regeneration projects and improved
capability
of the
Iraqi Security Forces. However, the assessment is also likely to
identify
a
requirement for further work to be done to tackle the criminal
elements of the
Iraqi
Police Service (especially death squad activities), the enduring
economic
296
Paper MOD
officials, [undated], ‘Afghanistan: Possible UK Military Response
to Revised NATO Force
Requirements’.
297
Minute
Brown to APS/SofS [MOD], 13 February 2007, ‘Iraq and Afghanistan:
Brief for DOP Meeting on
14 February
2007’.
298
Minute
Lever to PS/Lord Triesman, 13 February 2007, ‘DOP, 14 February:
Iraq’.
108