9.4 |
June 2005 to May 2006
elections.
And we ourselves were engaging in various outreach events to the
Sunni
community
during that period, both at Ministerial and official level. So I
think if there
was an
encapsulation, it was that we were adopting a more politically
sophisticated
approach
both to security and to politics in that critical period, or were
trying to.”84
168.
Mr Blair
and President Bush spoke by video conference on 1
September.85
169.
Mr Blair
proposed that the political strategy in Iraq should focus on the
December
elections
and should have two strands:
•
ensuring
greater Sunni participation, by “activity in Iraq led by Khalilzad
and
William
Patey” and by involving regional actors; and
•
“building a
moderate, secular platform which could succeed in the
elections”.
170.
Mr Blair
said that it would become clear to voters in Iraq that they had a
choice
between a
“strong unified and democratic Iraq” and one which was “weak,
divided
and sectarian”.
171.
The 26 August
IPU paper was discussed by the Iraq Strategy Group on
172.
The record of
the meeting shows that Sir Nigel Sheinwald highlighted a number
of
issues
emerging from the paper, for which clarity was needed on how they
were being
resolved,
specifically:
•
cancelled
DFID programmes (see Section 10.2);
•
lack of
progress on the police (see Section 12.1); and
•
a gap in
funding for the Iraqi armed forces (see Section 12.1).
173.
The FCO was
commissioned to produce a revised paper by 14 September
which
would
address in direct terms what the UK would be able to say it had
achieved by early
in
2006.
174.
The ISG also
considered Sunni reactions to the Constitution, and observed
that
they were
“not united”.
175.
The advice of
Mr Patey was “to give the Sunnis a little more time to take
stock, and
to support
them seeking some further final changes to the draft”.
84
Public
hearing, 16 December 2009, pages 41-42.
85
Letter
Quarrey to Siddiq, 1 September 2005, ‘Prime Minister’s VTC with
President Bush’.
86
Letter
Cabinet Office [junior official] to Sheinwald, 6 September 2005,
‘Iraq Strategy Group’.
517