The Report of the Iraq Inquiry

momentum. There are currently very few attacks on local security forces; the small

number of rejectionists continue to target MNF‑I. The absence of pressure from the

local population, or their leaders, for early withdrawal was striking.”1382

1513.  On 21 February, the FCO strategy for support to policing in Iraq in 2005 noted

that the GCPP had approved additional funding to ArmorGroup to allow mentoring to be

undertaken in Maysan.1383

1514.  By April, 20 ArmorGroup contractors were deployed under the co‑ordination of a

UK police Chief Inspector.1384 They were supported by four CPATT mentors.

1515.  The FCO produced an IPS Transition Plan on 7 September.1385 It stated that

57 percent of the IPS in Maysan had completed basic training and 93 percent had

undertaken other specialist training. The FCO judged that training was “largely on track”

and “transition targets should be met if co‑operation continues”.

1516.  On 10 October, Mr Wheeler produced an update of policing in each of the four

MND(SE) provinces.1386 On Maysan, he said:

“The lack of co‑operation by the Chief of Police has had a particularly detrimental

effect on what we have been able to achieve eg many police stations have still not

been visited by PAT. The security situation has constrained the work of PAT, and

CPATT and the Royal Military Police have been trying to fill the gap. And IPS/militia

affiliation is considerable eg there have been instances of IPS complicity in attacks

on MNF forces. The Chief of Police has been unwilling to be mentored. Very recently

he has withdrawn his students and instructors from the training programme, claiming

that ArmorGroup are not up to the job … Abuse of prisoners is still occurring … The

PJOC is fully equipped, but there is disagreement between the IPS, the Iraqi Army

and the Governor on its role …”

1517.  Mr Tansley visited Maysan from 2 to 3 December.1387 He reported that the area

“belie[d] its reputation” for being “lawless”. It had been “relatively peaceful in recent

months” with a lower number of attacks on MND(SE) than in Basra, and no attacks on

the ISF since November. Despite that, Mr Tansley reported that the threat remained

“relatively high”. He wrote:

“… beneath the surface there is an underlying tension. Unlike in neighbouring Dhi

Qar, the (relative) stability depends on an uneasy balance of power between the

Badrists and Sadrists, rather than co‑operation. The potential for the situation to

deteriorate quickly remains.”

1382  Telegram 24, Basra to FCO, 10 February 2005, ‘Iraq: Visit to Maysan Province’.

1383  Note FCO, 21 February 2005, ‘Iraq – UK Support to Civil Policing in Iraq – 2005’.

1384  Report Smith, 15 May 2005, ‘Next Steps on Policing – Review’.

1385  Letter FCO [junior official] to Cabinet Office [junior official], 7 September 2005, ‘Iraqi Police Service

Transition Plan for Southern Iraq’ attaching Paper Consulate Basra, 7 September 2005, ‘Southern Iraq:

Iraqi Police service – Transitional Plan’.

1386  Telegram 15268/05 Basra to FCO London, 10 October 2005, ‘Update on Reform of the Iraqi Police

Service in Southern Iraq’.

1387  eGram 20021/05 Basra to FCO, 6 December 2005, ‘Iraq: Visit to Maysan Province’.

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