3.7 |
Development of UK strategy and options, 1 February to 7 March
2003
Peace
Process forward so that the agenda of the international community
did not appear
one-sided”.
Following his discussion with President Bush, on 31 January,
Mr Blair
reported US
willingness to re-engage.
100.
Mr Blair
said that the next step was for Dr Blix and Dr ElBaradei
to return
to Baghdad:
“It was
possible that Saddam Hussein would show some movement
towards
compliance;
the Coalition military build-up would continue in the Gulf;
and
planning
for the aftermath of military action and humanitarian relief
needed
greater emphasis.”
101.
France had
“proposed more resources to support the inspectors”, but
Mr Blair said
that “the
issue was rather the lack of Iraqi co-operation, including their
failure to explain
the weapons
of mass destruction material which had been logged as missing in
1999,
and the
intimidation of scientists whom the inspectors wished to
interview”.
102.
Mr Blair
also stated that it was important to use the UN process to address
the
agenda of
the international community more broadly, such as on North Korea
and the
proliferation
of WMD more generally. The “likely identity of interest between
rogue states
and
terrorists who wanted to acquire weapons of mass destruction” was
“of particular
concern”.
The “presence of Al Qaida terrorists in Iraq was a reality which
was part of
the changing
picture”.
103.
Mr Straw
said that Secretary Powell’s presentation to the Security Council
had
been made
“forensically and calmly, with well chosen examples from
intelligence of Iraqi
mendacity”.
The “true colour and substance of the Iraqi regime had been
highlighted”.
104.
Mr Straw’s
view was that “it should be possible to gain consensus for a
further
resolution”
if the inspectors returned “without real concessions on Iraqi
compliance”.
The
focus “had to remain” on the UN route: “We could now be
entering the final phase”
with the
next report to the Council on 14 February.
105.
Mr Straw
also said that the aftermath was “being discussed intensively”
with
Ms Clare
Short, the International Development Secretary, and Mr Geoff
Hoon, the
Defence Secretary.
106.
The points
made in discussion included:
•
The use of
the word “aftermath” was “ill-chosen: it incorrectly implied that
Iraq
would be
utterly destroyed by military conflict whereas we should gear
our
thinking
around the future of the people of Iraq and their
interests”.
•
The
reconstruction and development of Iraq would “provide
opportunities
for British
companies to be involved”.
197