The Report
of the Iraq Inquiry
739.
The Butler
Report also stated that there was separate intelligence that
the
Iraqi regime
had made enquiries about the purchase of uranium ore from
the
Democratic Republic
of Congo and that there was some evidence that by 2002
a sale had
been agreed.412
740.
In the
Foreword to the dossier, Mr Blair also stated that he believed
the
assessed
intelligence had “established beyond doubt” that Saddam
Hussein
had “been
able to extend the range of his ballistic missile
programme”.413
741.
One of the Key
Judgements of the JIC Assessment of 10 May 2001 stated
that
there had
been “a step
change in progress” in Iraq’s
ballistic missile programme over
the
preceding two years.414
742.
The Assessment
itself made clear that the change related to work on
development
and infrastructure, including work on a “test
stand with the capacity for
much larger
engines than the Al Samoud”, rather than
production of missiles with
ranges
beyond the 150km permitted by the UN. It also stated that if Iraq
developed short
range
missiles with a range “well beyond” 150km, that would
“represent a step
change
in Saddam
Hussein’s military capabilities”.
743.
A Key
Judgement in the CIG Assessment of 15 March 2002 stated that
Iraq
had
retained “up to 20 Al
Hussein ballistic missiles” with a
range of 650km.415
The “location
and condition” of those missiles was “unknown”, although Iraq
had
“sufficient
engineering expertise to make them operational”.
744.
A further Key
Judgement in the 15 March CIG Assessment stated that Iraq
had
“begun
development of medium
range ballistic missiles [with a
range of] over
1000km
that could
target countries throughout the Middle East and Gulf region”,
but
Iraq would
“not be able
to produce such a missile before 2007 provided
sanctions
remain
effective”. The Assessment itself stated that “UN
sanctions and the work of
the inspectors” had
“caused significant problems for Iraq’s missile
industry”.
745.
The 15 March
CIG Assessment also stated that there were reports that Iraq
had
“succeeded
in developing a number of 200km range variants” of the liquid
propelled
Al Samoud
missile, but it was “unclear” whether those were for operational
use or for
the research
and development of a longer-range missile.
412
Review of
Intelligence on Weapons of Mass Destruction [“The
Butler Report”], 14 July 2004, HC 898,
paragraph
494.
413
Iraq’s
Weapons of Mass Destruction. The Assessment of the British
Government, 24
September 2002,
page
3.
414
JIC
Assessment, 10 May 2001, ‘Iraqi WMD Programmes: Status and
Vulnerability’.
415
CIG
Assessment, 15 March 2002, ‘The Status of Iraqi WMD
Programmes’.
258